The rationality of scientific discovery, part II: an aim oriented theory of scientific discovery by Maxwell, N
THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
PART H: AN AIM ORIENTED THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
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University of London 
In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No. 2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to 
rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be 
rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented 
empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific dis- 
covery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this 
theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems 
associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implica- 
tions both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself. 
9. Introduction. So far our almost exclusive concern has been to resolve the 
traditional rationality problem: How is it possible, in view of Humean sceptical 
arguments, that pure scientific inquiry can be a rational enterprise? I have argued 
that contemporary views of scientific inquiry are inadequate in that they all fail to 
solve this rather elementary problem concerning the mere possibility of science 
being rational. Aim oriented empiricism does however succeed in showing how it is 
possible-despite Hume-for pure science to be rational. 
My concern now is with a rather more important and fruitful rationality prob- 
lem, namely: How in detail ought we to pursue scientific inquiry in the best, the 
most rational way that we can, giving ourselves the greatest rational hope of meeting 
with success, granted that we accept the basic tenets of aim oriented empiricism? 
What, in other words, are the detailed implications for rational scientific practice, 
that flow from the rejection of standard empiricism, and the acceptance, in its 
stead, of aim oriented empiricism? 
I shall argue that once we accept aim oriented empiricism we are quickly led to 
accepting an entirely new aim oriented theory of scientific inquiry and scientific 
method which has a number of fruitful implications for rational scientific practice. 
According to the aim oriented theory, the heart of scientific method is concerned 
with rationally appraising and developing different possible aims or blueprints for 
science. Scientific method is in essence a method of rational scientific discovery, a 
procedure for choosing the best possible line of inquiry in the changing circum- 
stances of scientific research. 
I shall develop this theory in a quasi-deductive fashion, by taking the basic 
tenets of aim oriented empiricism for granted, and then considering how we ought 
to pursue the specified aims of science if we are to do so in the most rational way 
possible, giving ourselves the maximum chance of meeting with success. My 
primary concern, then, is to spell out a rational ideal for scientific inquiry. The 
theory put forward here is not intended to mirror accurately present day scientific 
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practice. Indeed a major part of my argument is that present day scientific practice 
is to a considerable extent irrational, due to the fact that the ideal of scientific 
rationality and scientific propriety accepted by most scientists, or at least implicit 
in much of the institutionalized standards of scientific research, is the entirelyfalse 
ideal of standard empiricism. As I pointed out in Part I of this essay, according to 
standard empiricism there cannot conceivably be a rational method of discovery, a 
rational procedure for choosing between rival possible aims for research, rival 
embryonic theories, rival blueprints. In this context of choosing between different 
possible lines for future research all must be hunch, guesswork, luck. According to 
standard empiricism, then, any attempt to choose in an articulate public fashion 
between rival aims for research must at best be an idle pastime, and at worst must 
be an utterly disreputable descent into unscientific, aprioristic metaphysical specula- 
tion. Thus, as a result of upholding standard empiricism and the ideal of scientific 
propriety that it represents, most scientists today make no attempt to choose 
between different ideas for future scientific research, different metaphysical blue- 
prints, in an articulate, public, rational fashion. Just that which aim oriented 
empiricism asserts to be the most important thing to do if we are to pursue science in a 
rationalfashion becomes something altogether disreputable and unscientific once we 
accept standard empiricism. In short the acceptance of standard empiricism amongst 
scientists leads to a positive discouragement of aim articulation and rational aim 
appraisal undertaken as an integral part of scientific inquiry, and this tends to 
inhibit successful rational scientific research. The more scientists strive to make their 
research conform to the false ideal of scientific propriety embodied in standard 
empiricism, the more sterile and unsuccessful their work must become; success in 
science has been achieved by those scientists who gave only a hypocritical allegiance 
to standard empiricism. 
All this indicates that it is of some importance to spell out the detailed implica- 
tions for scientific practice implicit in aim oriented empiricism. The hope is that this 
will enable us not only to understand science better, but will actually help us to do 
science in a better, more successful fashion. As a result of rejecting standard 
empiricism and accepting aim oriented empiricism in its stead, our ideal of scientific 
rationality and propriety will no longer inhibit and discourage scientific success, 
but will positively encourage us to pursue scientific inquiry in an ever more 
successful and rational fashion. 
In presenting this new aim oriented theory of scientific method I shall in the main 
have physics in mind. The general conception of scientific method to be advocated 
here is however intended to apply to all the various sciences, and not just to physics. 
We shall see that on one level, the theory specifies one unified methodology for all 
the different sciences and, on another level, implies that different sciences-in that 
they have different aims-have different methodologies. However, in order to 
develop the theory in detail it will be convenient to have one particular science in 
mind as we proceed. 
During the course of spelling out this aim oriented theory of scientific inquiry I 
shall come to grips with one crucial outstanding problem-namely the problem of 
simplicity or intelligibility. 
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10. The Importance of Rational Blueprint Choice for Scientific Inquiry. Our starting 
point, then, is that of Kepler and Einstein. At the outset we simply presuppose, 
without any grounds whatsoever, that the universe is ultimately simple, coherent, 
intelligible, harmonious, beautiful. (Or, at the very least, we assume that the world 
behaves as if it were these things, to a sufficient approximation to allow us to 
develop theories of ever increasing simplicity, coherence, explanatory power on the 
one hand, and ever increasing empirical success on the other hand.) We seek 
coherence, harmony, beauty, not because we have good reasons to suppose these 
things really do exist in the world, but because our passion to discover these things 
is so great, because the intrinsic value we place on the discovery of these things is so 
high, that we are prepared to devote ourselves to our long and arduous labors 
merely on the off-chance that what we hope to find does really exist. We seek 
harmony, beauty, intelligibility not as a means to some other end (such as empirical 
growth) but as something of intrinsic worth. Ugly, incoherent, unintelligible truth 
is of no interest to us whatsoever. If the universe is ultimately incoherent and un- 
intelligible, then that which we seek, in pursuing scientific inquiry just does not 
exist and our science must founder. It is, in other words, a wild, unjustified con- 
jecture that that which we seek in pursuing scientific inquiry does really exist. Our 
science is a shot in the dark, a wild, but rational gamble. 
At first sight it looks as if science pursued in this kind of way, without any 
rational assurance whatsoever that that which we seek does really exist, must be 
grossly irrational, being no more "scientific" than the most bizarre and absurd of 
pseudoscientific, quasi-religious disciplines one cares to think of, such as para- 
psychology, scientology, or whatever. It turns out, as we have seen, that just the 
reverse is the case. All attempts to wean science of the massive metaphysical pre- 
supposition that the universe is ultimately simple, inevitably plunge science into 
irrationality. All those orthodox views which characterize science as making no 
metaphysical presuppositions fail to exhibit science as a rational enterprise in that 
these views fail to provide any rationale for the exclusion of empirically successful 
aberrant theories. 
In pursuing scientific inquiry our ultimate aim, then, is to convert a more or less 
vague metaphysical theory-which asserts that the universe is ultimately simple, 
coherent etc.-into a precise, fully articulated, empirically testable scientific theory. 
More modestly, our aim is to develop theories which are progressively more and 
more successful empirically and which, at the same time, succeed in articulating 
more and more of the presupposed metaphysical theory. Our presupposed meta- 
physical theory is a kind of blueprint for our ideal future scientific theory. 
I come now to a point which I cannot emphasize too strongly. In setting up our 
science, and in pursuing the study of our science, the single most important and most 
intractable problem that can face us is precisely the problem of discovering the best 
possible aim or metaphysical blueprint for our science. 
It is hardly too much to say that everything depends on making the appropriate 
choice of aim or metaphysical blueprint. If we choose well, and our blueprint does 
correspond at least roughly to how things really are, then there is every chance that 
our science will forge ahead with great empirical success. For in this case our blue- 
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print will guide us to consider only appropriate kinds of new theories. And if in 
addition to being more or less true, our blueprint is relatively precise and specific, 
then we will have available all the more restrictive a delimitation of appropriate 
new theories to be considered; we will have something approaching a method of 
discovery. 
But if our fundamental metaphysical blueprint is a grotesquely false theory, so 
that the world-although intelligible-is not intelligible in anything like the kind of 
way specified by our blueprint, then our science cannot succeed. However rationally 
and brilliantly we pursue our science, we can get nowhere since all the time in con- 
sidering theories that are compatible with our basic blueprint, we will be consider- 
ing the wrong kind of theory, we will be considering theories that are all inevitably 
completely false. 
It is thus absolutely crucial for the success of our science that we make the best 
possible choice of blueprint. The history of science is in fact littered with research 
programs which were pursued with immense creative energy and "rationality," but 
which, after perhaps some initial success, got nowhere because the wrong choice of 
blueprint had been made, and this wrong choice was held onto inflexibly. One need 
only think of the research program of Plato and Ptolemy designed to show that the 
motion of heavenly bodies can be reduced to uniform circular motion (a blueprint 
retained even by Copernicus!). Or alternatively, one might think of the Aristotelian 
program for physics. One absolutely decisive factor, then, in the success achieved 
by such men as Kepler, Galileo and Newton, was-not that they repudiated meta- 
physics-but that they had the luck to choose a metaphysical view, a blueprint, 
which is near enough to how things really are-or at least near enough to how 
things appear to be. The thesis that the book of nature is written in the language of 
mathematics, that simple precise mathematical laws govern the motion of bodies, 
is a vast, wild conjecture, which today we all take for granted because of the im- 
mense empirical success of physics based on this conjecture. There is however no a 
priori reason why the universe has to be like this. The universe might very well be 
intelligible-in terms perhaps of some overall cosmic purpose-even though 
phenomena cannot be precisely described in terms of simple mathematical laws. 
And if this had been the case, the investigations of Kepler, Galileo and Newton 
would have got nowhere! 
The most important problem of all, then, that faces us in pursuing our search for 
intelligibility is to make the best possible choice of metaphysical blueprint. But it is 
just here that our science is most speculative, most vulnerable, most open to error! 
We have no reason whatsoever to suppose that the universe is intelligible at all. 
Much less, then, do we have a reason for supposing that the universe is intelligible 
in precisely such and such a way (e.g. because everything is made up of infinitely 
hard corpuscles which intract only by contact, or because everything is designed to 
fulfill some overall cosmic master plan). We can have, it seems, no reason whatso- 
ever for supposing that some specific metaphysical blueprint is actually true. Our 
chances of hitting on anything like the true blueprint seem infinitely remote. 
Thus that issue which it is of the utmost importance for us to settle correctly for 
our whole science-namely the issue of choosing a more or less true blueprint-is 
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also the issue which is the most difficult to settle correctly. Our choice of blueprint 
must remain irredeemably speculative and conjectural, an all but blind shot in the 
dark. 
It might be thought that these considerations simply show that no science can be 
rational which does make metaphysical presuppositions, and hence that the lesson 
to be learnt from all this is that we should forgo making all such unfounded meta- 
physical presuppositions. But this we cannot do. As we saw at length in Part I, it is 
precisely the overt disavowal of metaphysical presuppositions which creates the 
traditional rationality problem. Our fundamental aim is to seek intelligibility, 
comprehensibility; we must, then, if we are to be rational, at least conjecture that 
what we are looking for does exist; and hence we cannot avoid the problem of trying 
to decide what particular kind of intelligibility exists in the world. 
There is another consideration which reinforces this point. Our whole methodology 
(i.e. our set of rules of theory-acceptance) depends on our choice of metaphysical 
blueprint. If, for example, we choose as our basic blueprint some such thesis as 
"Everything that occurs does so in order to fulfil some overall cosmic purpose," 
then the whole methodology of our science will be radically different from what it 
would be if we chose a blueprint such as: "Everything that happens is a consequence 
of the interactions of fundamental corpuscles." In the two cases, entirely different 
kinds of theories would be considered acceptable. In other words, our methodo- 
logical rules of theory-acceptance, our criteria of intelligibility for theories, would 
be quite different. Thus our whole methodology depends on our choice of blueprint, 
and if we are to choose our methodology rationally it is obligatory that we choose 
rationally our fundamental metaphysical blueprint. And if we try to forgo choosing 
any blueprint at all, then we are bereft of any methodology, we can have no criteria 
of intelligibility, and we could not proceed at all. (The infinite realm of aberrant 
theories could not be rationally excluded.) 
All this shows that we cannot adopt the standard attitude to the problem of 
choosing the best metaphysical blueprint. We cannot argue that since choosing any 
particular metaphysical theory as the aim of science must be so utterly speculative 
and open to error, that it would be better not to choose any particular metaphysical 
blueprint at all. We have no alternative but to make some kind of choice. 
Thus the conclusion to be drawn from the fact that it is extremely difficult to make 
the best possible choice of blueprint is just the opposite of the orthodox viewpoint. 
Because choosing the best blueprint is both supremely difficult and supremely 
important, it is just here, above all, that we need to be as rational, conscious, 
deliberate and careful as possible. Instead of trying to brush the whole issue 
under the carpet, by leaving the matter to the hunches of individual investigators, 
we need to make the problem of choice of blueprint, choice of aim, as explicit, as 
open, public and objective as we possibly can. It is only if we choose our blueprint 
rationally that we can, it would seem, stand the faintest chance of succeeding with 
our science. 
We reach, then, a very remarkable result. In Part I it emerged that the funda- 
mental epistemological or methodological problem is the problem of the aims of 
science. The major hurdle in the way of resolving the pure rationality problem was 
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just explicitly acknowledging that science seeks explanatory truth, intelligible truth 
and thus makes massive metaphysical presuppositions. It now turns out that this 
basic epistemological problem is also the basic scientific problem. The fundamental 
problem that needs to be resolved, if we are to pursue scientific inquiry in the best, 
the most rational way possible is just: How are we to make the best, the most 
rational choice of aim, of metaphysical blueprint? The aim oriented theory of 
scientific inquiry to be given here is designed essentially to answer this basic 
scientific rationality question. The methodological rules of science will turn out to 
be rules for the rational appraisal of possible aims, or metaphysical blueprints 
construed as aims of science. 
Before we consider in detail the central problem of how the best possible aim for 
a science can be chosen, there is one simple but absolutely crucial point that must 
be stressed first. The point is this. If we are to choose rationally the best possible 
aim for our science it is essential that we consider alternative possible aims, it is 
essential that we remain constantly prepared to modify, or even drastically change 
the aim that we have chosen. The chances that, at any stage in our inquiries, we have 
made the best possible choice of aim are slim indeed. If we are to proceed rationally, 
then, it is essential that we attempt constantly to improve the chosen aim, or meta- 
physical blueprint, of our science. 
It might be thought that this readiness to change and improve the aim of a 
science is important only during the early stages of a science, before much empirical 
success has been achieved, but that once a science has become as mature and 
successful as modern physics, let us say, there is no longer any need to consider 
whether the aims of the science should be improved, and thus changed. 
This conclusion is quite wrong. However successful a science may be, the problem 
of improving the aim of that science will always remain perhaps the most funda- 
mental and important problem of that science. 
This point can be brought out like this. In choosing the best possible aim, or 
metaphysical blueprint, for a science, one invariably has to make the following 
kind of agonizing compromise between two opposing sets of desiderata. 
On the one hand, it is highly desirable to choose an aim or metaphysical blue- 
print which is as "broad," as loosely defined, as unrestrictive as possible. For if one 
chooses a very precise, narrowly-defined blueprint, one makes it very likely indeed 
that the blueprint is false, and that the whole science is committed to a blind alley. 
By choosing an aim as broad as possible, one does not commit one's science to too 
many highly specific metaphysical presuppositions, and hence there is much more 
chance that one's science has not been committed to a blind alley. Another way of 
putting this point would be to say that one should always have available a wide 
spectrum of different possible precise blueprints, instead of choosing just one of 
these precise blueprints, thereby risking that an entirely false blueprint has been 
chosen. 
According to this kind of consideration Plato should have chosen for astronomy 
the relatively broad blueprint: "Heavenly bodies move in accordance with precise 
simple mathematical laws" (which leaves open a wide choice of more specific blue- 
prints). In choosing the highly specific blueprint: "Heavenly bodies move in circles 
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with uniform motion" Plato chose a much too specific blueprint, and thus com- 
mitted astronomy to a blind alley. Again, according to this kind of consideration, 
in the seventeenth century it would be preferable to choose Galileo's blueprint: 
"Phenomena occur in accordance with a few simple, precise mathematical laws"; 
rather than the much more precise rendering of this blueprint: "The world is made 
up of a few different kinds of infinitely hard corpuscles, which interact only by 
contact, and which move in accordance with the laws of mechanics." 
All this, however, only spells out one kind of desideratum to be borne in mind in 
choosing the best possible aim available. For, on the other hand, a rather different 
set of considerations suggest that it is preferable to choose the most precise, the 
most restrictive, the most narrowly defined blueprint possible. If we choose a very 
broad, loosely defined aim, we will have little help available when it comes to 
developing specific testable theories put forward in an attempt to realize the aim. 
The more imprecise a blueprint is, the wider will be the range of possible testable 
theories compatible with the blueprint; and as a result the process of putting 
forward new conjectures-candidates for serious scientific consideration-will be 
all the more random, arbitrary and difficult. If, however, a science has a veryprecise, 
narrowly defined blueprint, then possible candidates for future scientific theories 
will be much more restrictively defined. Only a highly specific type of theory will be 
suitable. And if the blueprint is very precise and specific, there is always the hope 
that by making it just a little more precise-perhaps in an entirely nonarbitrary way- 
the blueprint will itself be transformed into a fully fledged testable scientific theory. 
In this way the process of articulating and improving the aim of the science will of 
itself have led to the development, or to the discovery, of a new scientific theory! 
Thus, from the standpoint of developing new scientific hypotheses, we need a 
blueprint as precise and narrowly defined as possible. We need one highly specific 
blueprint, and not a whole range of such blueprints. From this standpoint, Plato 
was entirely rational to advocate that astronomy adopt the highly specific blueprint: 
"Heavenly bodies move at a uniform rate in circles." Seventeenth century philos- 
ophers were entirely rational to choose some highly specific version of Galileo's 
blueprint, e.g. some version of the corpuscular hypothesis. 
It is clear that if we are to choose the best possible blueprint available, if we are 
to make our choice in the most rational way possible, then we must somehow make 
a judicious compromise between the above two opposing kinds of desiderata. We 
must pick a blueprint that is as specific, as narrowly defined as possible, so that the 
field of possible new scientific theories are narrowed down as much as can be, and 
we have something approaching a rational method of discovery. But on the other 
hand we must be constantly alive to the possibility that we may have committed 
our science to a false blueprint, to a blind alley, and we must be ready, particularly 
when our theorizing meets with no empirical success whatsoever, to broaden our 
blueprint, to modify it, so that a wider range of possible new theories can be 
considered. 
It is, I hope, clear that, from a rational standpoint, one would expect the need 
for this constant, agonized reappraisal of one's basic aim or blueprint to persist as a 
science evolves, however empirically successful and "mature" that science may 
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become. For if a science is highly successful empirically, if successive theories are 
put forward which lead to great empirical growth, and which move towards giving 
a more and more complete articulation of some rather precise blueprint, then one 
will want to make this "best" blueprint even more precise, in the hope that one 
will thereby transform it into a testable scientific hypothesis. Thus, however 
empirically successful our science may be, it will always be desirable, from a rational 
point of view, to narrow down the blueprint as much as possible, thereby 
strengthening the "logic of discovery" aspect of our science; and hence we will 
always need to be alive to the possibility that the blueprint has been made so specific 
that it is in factfalse, and that further progress requires a broadening of the blueprint. 
We will need constantly to reassess the blueprint that we have chosen, in an attempt 
to pick the best possible blueprint available for our science. 
There is an extremely important additional reason for claiming that, if we are to 
proceed in a rational fashion, then we will need constantly to modify, to improve 
our metaphysical blueprint. This additional reason can be put like this. 
Our prime objective, in pursuing our science, is to seek explanatory truth, 
intelligible truth. Our science places a premium on intelligibility, simplicity, beauty 
for its own sake, and not as a means to some other end. We are therefore rationally 
entitled, other things being equal, to choose that metaphysical blueprint, M, say, 
which embodies our very highest ideal of intelligibility, simplicity, beauty, which 
promises to lead us to the development of the best possible explanation of 
phenomena. 
However, having made such a choice, it is more than likely that as we proceed we 
will begin to notice certain purely a priori imperfections in M. M, we will realize, 
contains certain wholly arbitrary assumptions. M may be simply a special case of a 
much more general kind of metaphysical theory. It may even be the case that we 
discover inconsistencies in M. In brief, as we proceed, we discover that M can no 
longer be taken as embodying our ideal of intelligibility, simplicity. Our standards 
of intelligibility have been raised. Our aim, our blueprint, for our science, needs to 
be improved. We need a new metaphysical theory M1 to replace M. And granted 
that we can establish, in an entirely objective fashion, that M1 embodies greater 
simplicity, intelligibility than M, then, other things being equal, it will be entirely 
rational for us to adopt M1 as the aim of our science rather than M, since our whole 
science places an intrinsic premium on intelligibility, for its own sake. 
Thus it is to be expected that as we proceed we will need constantly to improve 
our basic metaphysical blueprint as we detect inadequacies in the existing blueprint 
from the point of view of intelligibility, or simplicity. Our standards of intelligibility 
or simplicity, our conception of what can be "explained," ought constantly to rise, 
and become more ambitious, if we are to seek for the best possible explanation for 
phenomena in the most rational way. It is my view and I shall argue that through 
much of the history of physics we can see a constant raising of the standards of 
intelligibility, a constant improvement in the fundamental blueprint of physics 
from the standpoint of intelligibility considerations. 
The model of scientific inquiry articulated so far, might be schematized like this 
(see Figure 1). 
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The aim of science is to develop testable scientific theories which give a more and 
more precise and complete articulation of the metaphysical blueprint, and which at 
the same time successfully predict more and more empirical phenomena. The thesis 
that the universe is ultimately simple, coherent, intelligible (in some more or less 
specific way) is just the thesis that a physical theory which gave a complete, precise 
articulation of the presupposed metaphysical blueprint, would in principle predict 
all physically possible empirical phenomena (in the diagram I have tried to represent 
this by means of the slanting dotted lines). At any stage at least three kinds of 
problems should arise in a science. First, there will be empirical problems, which 
arise when the accepted scientific theories clash with (or at least fail to predict) 
accepted empirical phenomena. (In this case either the relevant theories need to be 
modified or replaced, or the empirical "laws" need to be modified or replaced. We 
cannot assume that in the advent of a clash between theory and experiment it is 
always the theory which must give way.) 
Second, there will be what I have called theoretical problems which arise essen- 
tially because accepted scientific theories do not succeed in providing anything like 
a complete, precise articulation of the presupposed metaphysical blueprint. 
Theoretical problems will arise even in the absence of serious empirical problems. 
A theoretical problem, typically, will take the following form: How can the current, 
best, fundamental theory, T, be so modified or replaced that a more complete 
articulation of the metaphysical blueprint may be achieved in the form of an 
empirically testable scientific theory? One specific kind of theoretical problem 
arises when two fundamental scientific theories clash (as in the case today, for 
example, of the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics). An absolute 
minimal demand for an adequate scientific articulation of the presupposed meta- 
physical blueprint is, after all, that the accepted scientific theories are compatible. 
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Another specific kind of theoretical problem arises when an empirically successful 
fundamental theory is more or less incompatible with the adopted aim, or meta- 
physical blueprint, of the science. In this case one of two things may happen: either 
the theory is retained and the aim, the metaphysical blueprint is modified, so that it 
becomes compatible with the theory; or alternatively, the metaphysical blueprint is 
retained and the theory is modified or replaced. We will be rational in attempting 
to bring the latter about (i.e. in attempting to make our theory conform to our aim, 
rather than our aim to our theory) in those situations where to change our aim 
would lead to a drastic decrease in the inherent simplicity, intelligibility etc. of our 
adopted metaphysical blueprint. Thus, just as accepted empirical "laws" may quite 
rationally be rejected, or revised, when they clash with a "good" theory, so a good 
theory may quite rationally be rejected or modified if it clashes with a good aim. 
The third kind of problem that arises in scientific inquiry, according to the model 
being advocated here, arises in connection with attempts to improve the accepted 
aim, or metaphysical blueprint. As I have already remarked, a metaphysical blue- 
print may initially appear to embody the quintessence of simplicity, coherence and 
intelligibility; but may later be found to be in certain aspects arbitrary, incoherent, 
or even inconsistent. Aim improvement problems arise when such arbitrary, 
incoherent or inconsistent features are discovered in the accepted metaphysical 
blueprint. 
Once we accept aim oriented empiricism and the above aim oriented model of 
scientific inquiry, the very serious and damaging inadequacies of orthodox views 
about science become all too apparent. In contrast to the above aim oriented model 
of scientific inquiry schematized in Figure 1, the more sophisticated versions of the 
orthodox model might be schematized like this: 
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The difference between Figures 1 and 2 is quite startling. The problems that are 
perhaps the most important from the point of view of the development of know- 
ledge-namely what I have called theoretical problems and aim improvenent 
problems-have simply vanished from the picture. The orthodox model, in 
suppressing the metaphysical presuppositions of science, suppresses all hope of 
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rationally assessing and rationally improving these presuppositions. And perhaps 
most disastrously of all, the orthodox model suppresses any possibility of developing 
new theories, in a rational manner, by articulating and making more precise the 
metaphysical presuppositions. 
11. An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Method. I come now to the specific theory 
of scientific method that I wish to advocate. 
The fundamental problem of scientific inquiry, at any stage, is, I have argued, to 
make the best possible choice of aim, of metaphysical blueprint. This is both the 
most important thing to get right, and often the most difficult. The fundamental 
rules of scientific investigation are, then, I suggest, rules for selecting the best 
possible aim or blueprint in various sorts of circumstances. A mature science ought, 
I suggest, to proceed by steadily and progressively modifying and improving the 
chosen blueprint in a highly conscious, articulate, public, objective manner, by 
solving aim articulation problems inherent in the chosen blueprint, and by modify- 
ing the chosen blueprint in response to empirical pressure, in a highly critical 
fashion. As we shall see below, a succession of rational modifications in a given 
blueprint, designed to solve successive problems of the blueprint, can lead to 
dramatic, revolutionary changes at the level of scientific theory. In other words, a 
steady, rational continuity of development is often discernible in science at the 
level of blueprints, where all is discontinuity and revolution at the level of theory. 
Thus, whereas methodological rules which specified how one ought to modify and 
improve scientific theories in progressive almost continuous steps would quickly 
stultify scientific development (since vital discontinuous revolutionary steps would 
be repressed) this does not apply in the case of blueprints. Steady, rational blue- 
print modification can lead to profound and dramatic conceptual change. The 
methodological rules put forward here are then quite properly primarily rules for 
the modification of existing blueprints. 
Our discussion of the problem of how to make a rational choice of the best 
available blueprint, in section 9, has in effect already provided us with a few elemen- 
tary rules for the selection of the best aim. We have to begin with: 
Rule 1. Other things being equal, choose that aim, that blueprint, which is the most 
intelligible, simple, coherent, harmonious, explanatory, unified, beautiful. (In part 
at least this will mean choose that blueprint which promises to lead to the develop- 
ment of the most intelligible, simple etc. testable scientific theory.) 
The rationale behind this rule is quite simply that our whole investigation places 
a premium on simplicity, intelligibility, for its own sake. We thus quite reasonably 
choose that blueprint which gives the best promise of leading us to the realization 
of our overall aim. 
We also saw in the last section that in picking the best possible aim we must make 
a kind of agonized compromise-a compromise which will need constant re- 
appraisal-between picking the narrowest possible blueprint-and hence having 
something approaching a logic of discovery-and picking the broadest possible 
blueprint-in which case we lessen the danger of committing our science to a blind 
alley. We need, then, two rules which specify in what circumstances it is rational to 
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make our chosen aim narrower or broader. These two rules may perhaps be put 
like this. 
Rule 2. Suppose the aim of a science is the rather broad blueprint B (which we may 
think of as being the conjunction of the different, much more precise blueprints 
B1, B2 . . . B,). Suppose attempts to realize B have led to the development of a 
succession of theories T1 T2 ... which have been enormously successful empirically, 
i.e. have led to great empirical growth. Further, let us suppose that these successive 
theories can very reasonably be held to give successively more complete articula- 
tions of Br say, but cannot be held to tend towards any of B1 or B2 ... Bn excluding 
Br. The empirically very successful research program points at Br, as it were, and 
does not point at any of B1, B2 etc. In these circumstances, other things being equal, 
it will be rational to choose Br as the aim of the science rather than B. 
The next rule specifies the circumstances under which we ought to broaden our 
aim. 
Rule 3. Suppose the aim of a science is B, and theories put forward in attempts to 
realize B have met with little or no empirical success. In this case, other things 
being equal, it will be rational to broaden B, so that it becomes, let us say, the 
conjunction of B1 and B. 
In brief, Rule 2 tells us that if our science is meeting with great empirical success, 
then we are entitled to narrow our blueprint, if we can do this in a nonarbitrary 
way. And Rule 3 tells us that if our science is meeting with little or no empirical 
success then we are entitled to broaden our blueprint. But of course this narrowing 
and broadening of aims must be done, as much as possible in conformity with 
Rule 1. 
There are now two further general rules of scientific inquiry which deserve to be 
mentioned. 
Rule 4. Other things being equal, choose that aim which gives the best a priori 
promise of leading to an empirically successful research program. 
Consider the following two radically different blueprints: M1: all phenomena 
occur in accordance with simple, precise mathematical laws. M2: all phenomena 
arise as a consequence of the desires, intentions, aims, of spirits which inhabit the 
world. The point is now this. If M1 is true, we have every hope of developing an 
immensely successful and productive empirical research program, taking M1 as 
the basic blueprint. There is every hope of developing theories which have suc- 
cessively greater and greater explanatory power, which provide an ever more 
comprehensive, more precise account of phenomena while at the same time moving 
towards providing a steadily more complete articulation of the basic blueprint. 
There is in other words every hope that the kind of progressive development that is 
such a striking characteristic of physics during the last three hundred years, will 
take place. Early theories (Galileo, Kepler) will be corrected and surpassed by 
later theories (Newton), which will in turn be corrected and surpassed by later 
theories still (Einstein), but at the same time the later theories will reduce, as an 
approximation within some restricted domain, to the earlier theories. Even though 
corrected and surpassed, the early theories will remain permanent contributions to 
the development of knowledge. 
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If, however, we suppose M2 is true, all this looks most unlikely. Any number of 
particular, ad hoc postulates will be needed concerning the desires, moods, whims, 
intentions of all the various spirits, and it seems unlikely that a research program 
based on M2 could develop the progressive character just described. Particular 
hypotheses concerning spirits even if true for a while, may well become out of date 
as spirits change their goals. Knowledge will constantly need to be revised, without 
this endless revision necessarily leading to an overall progressive evolution, or 
development. 
Other things being equal, then, we ought to choose M1 rather than M2, since Ml 
offers more hope of success than M2. It was, I suggest, primarily this consideration 
which favored-from a rational standpoint-the metaphysics of Galileo, and of 
the seventeenth century corpuscularians over the metaphysics of Aristotelianism. 
Galileo's blueprint, if true, promises great empirical growth, whereas the blueprint 
of Aristotelianism with its ad hoc and teleological characteristics, if true, promises 
only rather slow, piecemeal, unprogressive empirical growth. 
The example I have chosen to illustrate Rule 4 may seem today rather fanciful. It 
would be wrong however to conclude from this that Rule 4 has no relevance for 
contemporary science. I am inclined to think that it plays a decisive factor in the 
selection of aims or blueprints for scientific research projects. Invariably, a scientist 
will be confronted by innumerable, possible alternative blueprints, none of which 
may be ruled out on grounds of implausibility. If he is to proceed at all, it is vital 
that he has some tentative a priori way of grading these possible blueprints. One 
way is, of course, to grade them in terms of inherent intelligibility or simplicity. 
But another extremely important way is to grade them by means of Rule 4. To out- 
siders scientists often seem incredibly myopic and conservative in that unconven- 
tional metaphysical ideas-such as those of parapsychology-are simply ignored. 
But from the standpoint of science the problem is to cut down on the vast wealth of 
possible metaphysical blueprints; and given the fundamental concern of science to 
develop empirically progressive research programs, it is essential-and certainly 
entirely rational-that science should favor those metaphysical blueprints which 
promise to lead to the development of empirically progressive research programs. 
We come now to a rule of a rather different type from the above. It is a rule which 
specifies how we ought to choose ordinary methodological rules of theory- 
acceptance once we have chosen the best possible aim. In essence the rule can be 
stated quite simply like this. 
Rule 5. Choose those methodological rules of theory-acceptance which give the 
best, the most rational hope of leading to a successful realization of the best aim, or 
metaphysical blueprint. 
The decisive point behind Rule 5 is this. The kind of theory that we will regard 
as acceptable may well depend crucially on the kind of aim we have adopted, the 
kind of metaphysical blueprint which exemplifies our ideal of an intelligible, 
comprehensive theory. Thus if our blueprint is: "The world is made up entirely of 
many infinitely hard corpuscles which interact only by contact," the kind of theory 
that we will be prepared to regard as intelligible and acceptable will in general be 
quite different from what we would regard as intelligible and acceptable if our blue- 
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print were, let us say: "Everything occurs in order to help bring about some overall 
cosmic purpose." The two blueprints would give rise to different methodological 
rules of theory-acceptance. If we adopt the first blueprint, then, quite rationally we 
would adopt methodological rules such as: Accept action-by-contact theories. 
Reject action-at-a-distance theories. Reject teleological theories. If, on the other 
hand, we were to adopt the second blueprint, then we should of course accept the 
methodological rule: Only teleological theories are ultimately acceptable. 
Thus the methodological rules, R, of theory-acceptance, which it is rational to 
accept for a science, depend crucially on the nature of the blueprint B of that 
science. A change of blueprint B is almost bound to necessitate a change of 
methodological rules. Thus at once we see the need for Rule 5. 
The thing might be summed up like this. Once we accept the above aim oriented 
model of scientific inquiry, we are led immediately to the thesis that a science can 
be rational only if it is ready constantly to change its basic blueprint. And this in 
turn immediately leads to the conclusion that the science must be ready constantly 
to change its methodological rules of theory-acceptance. And this in turn implies 
that we need a rule, such as Rule 5, which specifies how methodological rules of 
theory-acceptance ought rationally to be changed with a change of blueprint. 
We need to distinguish here three levels of statements, 
level I-ordinary scientific theories. 
level 2-methodological rules which specify under what circumstances 
scientific theories (level 1 statements) should be accepted and rejected 
(or how they should be graded). 
level 3-methodological rules which specify under what circumstances level 2 
rules should be accepted and rejected. 
The above Rules 1-5 are, in fact, all level 3 rules, since in specifying what aim or 
blueprint ought to be chosen, these rules in effect determine-via Rule 5-what 
level 2 methodological rules ought to be chosen. The theory of scientific method 
embodied in the above methodological Rules 1-5 thus constitutes an entirely new 
conception of scientific method. For up until now all those who have sought to 
characterize scientific method have tried to do so in terms of level 2 methodological 
rules. 
The reason why it is absolutely obligatory to characterize scientific method on 
what up until now has been thought of as the "metamethodological" level-i.e. in 
terms of level 3 rules-can be brought out quite decisively from the following 
elementary considerations. As we saw in section 5 of Part I, whether or not it is 
rational to accept or reject a given theory may depend crucially on what our 
purpose, our ultimate aim is, in considering the theory. In other words different 
aims give rise to different rational rules of theory acceptance. Now if all the different 
sciences at all times had one and the same basic aim-to search for truth as such, 
let us suppose-then the fixed, universal rules of scientific inquiry could well be 
formulated entirely in terms of level 2 statements. We would only need to move 
onto the "metamethodological" level to consider the question of the rationality or 
acceptability of any proposed level 2 rules; and once agreement had been reached, 
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then scientific method could be quite adequately characterized in terms of the 
agreed level 2 rules of theory-acceptance. 
The basic assumption here-that all the different sciences at all times have the 
same fixed aim-is, however, quite grotesquely false. First, as we have seen, a 
single science, from a purely rational standpoint ought constantly to change its 
basic aim or blueprint as it progresses. And if we actually look at the development 
of any science we see a constant change and evolution of basic blueprint. Physics, 
for example, can be regarded as having had in succession the following five very 
different basic aims or metaphysical blueprints. 
(a) Aristotle's teleological metaphysical system, which asserts that phenomena 
occur as a consequence of things trying to actualize their potentia. 
(b) The aim of seventeenth century corpuscularians and Cartesians to explain 
phenomena in terms of the motions of corpuscles which interact only by 
contact. 
(c) The aim of classical mechanistic physics (Newton (?), Boscovich, Helm- 
holtz) to explain all phenomena in terms of the motion of point-atoms which 
interact by means of central forces of attraction and repulsion which vary with 
distance. 
(d) The aim of classical field theory (Einstein): to explain all phenomena in 
terms of a unified field theory. 
(e) The aim of modern physics, which is highly problematic, but which differs 
radically from (a) to (d) in that nature is assumed to have a fundamentally 
indeterministic or probabilistic feature. 
There is of course nothing special about physics in this connection. Almost all 
other sciences have experienced radical changes of basic aims as they have evolved. 
It might be thought that if we consider the successive blueprints of physics 
indicated above ((a) to (e)), then we can detect certain features that are common to 
all these blueprints, and these common features give rise to fixed level 2 rules of 
theory-acceptance in physics. It is, for example, often held that acceptable physical 
laws must be strictly universal, must refer to no specific time or place, or must be 
invariant with respect to space and time. But the idea that there can be such fixed 
level 2 intelligibility rules of theory-acceptance, which cannot be abandoned within 
the context of physical inquiry, is in effect to commit physics to a dogmatic, 
irrational aim. To demand that physical laws be invariant with respect to space and 
time is to commit physics to a specific metaphysical blueprint-which postulates 
homogeneity to space and time-which cannot be rejected or revised in any cir- 
cumstances whatsoever. And this is clearly undesirable. Nature may well be 
intelligible even though her basic laws are not invariant with respect to space and 
time-and if we are to proceed rationally, we certainly ought not to exclude a 
priori such a possibility. 
As far as physics is concerned, the idea that there are in the world certain 
invariant properties which persist through all change no doubt lies at the very heart 
of the idea that Nature is intelligible. Indeed the blueprints (a) to (e) above should 
be interpreted just as specifying what are the unchanging properties of things. We 
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want to be able, however, to change our views as to what are the ultimate invariant 
properties in the world. And to do this will in effect involve changing the level 2 
intelligibility rules of theory-acceptance. Modern physics in fact reveals that the 
accepted level 2 intelligibility rules-invariance and symmetry principles-do 
change with time. Even the time honored rules concerning the invariance of laws 
with respect to space and time-closely associated with the blueprint thesis that 
space and time are homogeneous-were denied by Aristotle, and have been 
radically transformed by general relativity. General relativity can hardly be said to 
conform to these rules, since it is itself a theory about the structure of space-time. 
Rather, general relativity may be said to conform to a generalization of these 
invariance principles, namely to the principle of general covariance. 
My fundamental argument in support of the general theory of scientific method 
being advocated here can, then, be summarized like this. 
(i) Once we accept the general aim oriented viewpoint it becomes clear that the 
single most important and most intractable problem that faces a science is to 
make the best, the most rational choice of basic blueprint. The basic rules of 
scientific inquiry need then to be rules for the rational selection of the best 
possible blueprint in the ever changing context of scientific research, and it is 
just this which the theory of scientific method advocated here supplies. 
(ii) Once we accept (a) that the acceptability of a theory depends on our basic 
aim; and (b) the rational pursuit of scientific inquiry requires a constant change 
of aim or blueprint, then it becomes clear that level 2 rules of theory-accept- 
ability will change as science evolves. It becomes inevitable that the fixed, 
universal rules of scientific inquiry must be formulated as level 3 rules, which 
specify under what circumstances the aim of a science should be changed, and 
how such a change effects accepted level 2 rules. We thus end up with the 
theory of scientific method advocated here, and summarized in terms of the 
above level 3 Rules 1-5. 
There are now one or two brief comments that I wish to make about the above 
theory of scientific method. 
It should be noted first that Rules 1 and 4 are both a priori rules, in that they 
specify criteria for the selection of blueprints in terms of nonempirical considera- 
tions. Rules 2 and 3 specify how blueprints ought to be modified or changed in the 
light of empirical considerations. And Rule 5 in effect specifies what it means to say 
that an empirically progressive succession of theories T1, T2, ... favors or does not 
favor some particular blueprint B on empirical grounds. If the theories T1, T2, ... 
are increasingly acceptable from the point of view of those level 2 rules most 
appropriate for the blueprint B, then B is favored on empirical grounds. If, how- 
ever, the theories Ti, T2, ... are increasingly unacceptable from the point of view of 
level 2 rules appropriate to B, then B meets with corresponding empirical dis- 
favor. 
It is more than likely that the a priori Rules 1 and 4 will clash with the empirical 
Rules 2 and 3, in that Rule 3, let us say, favors a blueprint B1 and Rule 1 favors a 
rather different blueprint B2. Such a clash in effect gives rise to the kind of theoreti- 
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cal problem discussed briefly above. No foolproof, general rule can be laid down 
for resolving such a clash. One can say, however, that in attempting to improve the 
most intelligible blueprint by making it even more intelligible (in accordance with 
Rule 1), by solving what I have called aim improvement problems, it will be 
extremely important to take up hints and suggestions from the most empirically 
successful lines of research. If the most intelligible blueprint is BI, and the most 
empirically successful blueprint is B2, then every attempt should be made to see 
whether B1 can be improved on intelligibility grounds so that, in addition, it 
becomes compatible with B2. In other words, in the advent of a clash between 
Rules 1 and 4 (which favor B1) and Rules 2 and 3 (which favor B2), every attempt 
should be made to evolve a new aim B3 which is favored by all four rules. Aim 
improvement on intelligibility grounds may well need the constant inspiration of 
empirical considerations; it should not however be the slave of empirical considera- 
tions. It is, of course, just the fundamental metaphysical presupposition inherent in 
scientific inquiry that Rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 will not permanently clash. If a science 
develops in such a way that the blueprint favored by Rule 1 becomes ever more 
and more different from the blueprint favored by Rules 2 and 3, then that science 
becomes increasingly problematic. A science in such a state ceases to be genuinely 
progressive and successful, even though empirical success may still be achieved. 
The theory of scientific method embodied in the above Rules 1-5 is primarily a 
methodology which assesses the acceptability of theories. But in order to do this 
rationally, we need to assess possible aims or blueprints, and hence the emphasis on 
the assessment of blueprints in the above rules. The theory is also, however, 
implicitly, a methodology of scientific discovery, a methodology for the rational 
development or invention of new scientific hypotheses. In order to make this aspect 
of the theory explicit, here is a sixth rule, more or less implicit in Rules 1-5, which 
specifies procedures for the rational development of new scientific theories. 
Rule 6. New scientific theories are to be developed by detecting and solving the 
three kinds of problems indicated above. Of these, the most important by far are 
aim improvement problems. By articulating more and more clearly the chosen 
blueprint of the science, and seeking ways of making the blueprint more and more 
intelligible, simple, precise and restrictive, in a nonarbitrary way, there is the hope 
that one will be able to formulate level 2 methodological principles (such as the 
various invariance and symmetry principles of modern physics), which any new 
theory must conform to if it is to help us realize the chosen blueprint. Such level 2 
principles of intelligibility or simplicity may then lead to the development of new 
scientific hypotheses. As we shall see below, it was precisely this rational method of 
discovery that Einstein employed in developing the special and general theories of 
relativity. 
Identifying and solving theoretical or compatibility problems also provides a 
rational method for the discovery of new theories. Here one might mention 
Dirac's development of his relativistic quantum theory, evolved precisely as a 
solution to the problem of making quantum mechanics compatible with the level 2 
intelligibility principle of Lorentz invariance. 
Finally, in order to develop new and better scientific theories, it is of course 
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important to detect and attempt to solve empirical problems. An empirical problem 
that cannot be solved within the framework of the existing scientific theory T alerts 
us to the fact that T is unsatisfactory and needs to be replaced. In other words, we 
discover that Tis not an adequate solution to the aim improvement or compatibility 
problem which it was designed to solve; we therefore need to return again to these 
problems to develop a more adequate solution. 
The discovery of empirical problems is a vital part of the overall process of 
scientific discovery and development. However, according to the theory advocated 
here, empirical problems are not the sole spur to scientific development. Both aim 
improvement problems and compatibility problems can exist in the complete 
absence of any empirical problems; and when it comes to the development of 
fundamental new theories, aim improvement and compatibility problems are with- 
out doubt far more important and fruitful than empirical problems. It is, in other 
words, by tackling aim improvement and compatibility problems that fundamental 
advances are made in a subject; empirical problems only become important in this 
respect if there are reasons for holding that such problems are closely associated 
with important compatibility or aim improvement problems. 
Having outlined the above aim oriented theory of scientific method, I have now 
to confess that considerations to be developed below, arising from a discussion of 
the key notion of intelligibility, will lead us to an important modification of the 
above theory, at least as far as the theory applies to physics. 
12. Intelligibility and the Search for Understanding. According to aim oriented 
empiricism, the fundamental goal of pure science is to improve our understanding 
of the world around us. We do not want merely to accumulate more and more 
truths about the world; nor do we want merely to predict successfully more and 
more phenomena with more and more accuracy. We want something much more 
than this, namely understanding. On this view, to say that a new theory makes a 
contribution to knowledge is to say just that the theory helps us to improve our 
understanding of the world around us. 
It is, however, a main tenet of aim oriented empiricism that understanding is not 
to be had in any possible universe: it is only in a universe that possesses a certain 
inherent coherence, simplicity, harmony, unity, order, lawfulness or, as we may 
say, intelligibility, that that which we seek in seeking understanding exists to be 
found at all. On this view, to "understand" is just to see that ostensibly random, 
complex, arbitrary, diverse phenomena are really simple, coherent, unified, 
homogeneous or "intelligible." Thus, our decision to pursue the scientific quest for 
understanding in effect commits us to taking entirely seriously the wholly speculative 
metaphysical idea that the universe is intelligible. It is as if our whole science is an 
attempt to discover more and more about a certain object-namely the inherent 
intelligibility of the universe, the intelligible structure of the universe. We do not 
have good reasons for holding that this object really does exist; we do not, in other 
words, have good reasons for holding that it is true that the universe is intelligible. 
But so passionately do we desire to discover intelligibility, of such supreme value do 
we hold the discovery of intelligibility to be, that, quite rationally, we are willing to 
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undertake our search even though we cannot be sure that that which we seek really 
does exist, and even though we cannot be sure that we have found that which we 
seek, however amazingly successful our scientific search may appear to have been. 
According to aim oriented empiricism, then, scientific progress is not to be 
equated merely with developing theories which successfully predict more and more 
phenomena more and more accurately. In addition to this we require that our 
theories are of increasing inherent intelligibility. In fact, for real progress in science 
our very standards of intelligibility ought steadily to improve. That is, for real 
progress we should require not only that our theories are increasingly intelligible in 
some fixed sense of 'intelligible' but, in addition, we should require that our theories 
are increasingly intelligible, even though our very standards of intelligibility are 
themselves improving, becoming more powerful and exacting. Our ideals of 
intelligibility, enshrined in our chosen blueprint, ought themselves to evolve and 
improve. The greater the intelligibility of our best theories, the more our under- 
standing of the world is thereby enhanced, the greater the contribution to know- 
ledge, and the more perfectly the fundamental aims of pure science are realized. 
Understanding is the supreme goal, the supreme desideratum, of intellectual 
inquiry: it is thus ultimately in order that our interests shall be served, our intellec- 
tual ends realized, that we demand that our theories become more and more 
intelligible as science proceeds. 
But what, it may be asked, is intelligibility (simplicity, coherence, unity, beauty, 
etc.) ? What is it that we mean, at the broadest level, when we say that science seeks 
to discover intelligibility inherent in phenomena? Very roughly, I have indicated 
the kind of thing that it means to say that the universe is "intelligible"; it is to say 
that a metaphysical theory, more or less like one of those indicated in sections 6 
and 11 above, is true. But what is it that these blueprints have in common that 
prompts us to declare that each blueprint provides us with a more or less "intel- 
ligible" picture of the universe? How, for example, are blueprints to be compared 
with respect to their "intelligibility" ? The whole import of the argument so far has 
been to show that it is absolutely essential that we can make an a priori choice 
between rival blueprints with respect to their intelligibility if science is to be rational. 
We need to be able to make such apriori choices between rival possible metaphysical 
blueprints both from the standpoint of developing new scientific theories in a 
rational manner, and, perhaps even more important, from the point of view of 
choosing rationally between rival empirically successful scientific theories. Without 
Rule 1 of section 11, in other words, the whole rationality of science founders. But 
if we are to choose between rival blueprints with respect to their intelligibility in a 
rational manner, we clearly must have some extremely broad, agreed idea as to 
what intelligibility is which is not to be explicated in terms of some specific blue- 
print. It is to this question of what 'intelligibility' ought to be interpreted to mean in 
general (at least as far as physics is concerned) that I now turn. 
The first point that I wish to emphasize is that as long as we leave things 
sufficiently vague and intuitive, there can be no doubt at all that there is a meaning- 
ful notion of "intelligibility," not tied down to any specific blueprint, which plays 
an enormously important role in science. That science persistently seeks simplicity, 
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unity, coherence, order, lawfulness, harmony, beauty, explanatoriness or intel- 
ligibility in some sense of these terms, can hardly be doubted by anyone, whatever 
their views may be about the nature of scientific inquiry and scientific knowledge. 
Even the most casual glance at the history of physics, let us say, reveals the enor- 
mous importance that notions such as these have played in influencing the direction 
of research, and in influencing evaluations of contributions to knowledge. For 
example, the hope that nature may ultimately turn out to be simple, coherent, 
unified or intelligible can be seen to lie behind the seventeenth century idea that all 
natural phenomena arise as a consequence of the arrangements and motions of a 
few different sorts of elementary corpuscles, interacting only by contact; the same 
hope lies behind the Faraday-Einstein idea that everything is made up of one 
unified field; and it lies behind Wheeler's idea [18] that there is in the end only 
curved empty space with changing topological features. The same goal of seeking 
underlying simplicity, unity, beauty, intelligibility thus lies behind the advocacy of 
wildly different blueprints. 
Some of the greatest contributions to science are precisely contributions which 
"unify" apparently diverse phenomena (often against a background of entirely 
different metaphysical blueprints): there is, for example, Newton's unification of the 
motion of terrestrial and astronomical bodies by means of his laws of motion and 
law of gravitation; Maxwell's unification of electricity, magnetism and optics 
(further unified by the special theory of relativity); Einstein's unification of gravita- 
tion and geometry. Again, there is the discovery of the relatively few chemical 
elements, from which all the millions of diverse chemical compounds can be built 
up; there is Mendeleev's discovery of a pattern in the properties of the elements; 
and the twentieth century discovery that all matter is built up of just three types of 
particles-electrons, protons and neutrons. There is the tremendous unification 
achieved by quantum theory-a few relatively simple physical postulates sufficing 
in principle to predict and explain all the vast diversity of physical and chemical 
properties of ordinary matter. And there is the discovery that all natural phenomena 
can be understood in terms of just four (or even possibly only three) kinds of forces 
or interactions. The whole program of physical inquiry is clearly committed to the 
discovery of unity, simplicity, order, coherence, harmony, symmetry (in some sense 
of these terms) at a fundamental level, and when this is not found-as for example 
in the case of the discovery of more and more so-called fundamental particles-the 
assumption is invariably made that a more basic kind of unity, simplicity, etc. 
underlies the ostensible complexity and multiplicity so far revealed. Even in the 
scientific search for natural law we must see the search for simplicity or coherence 
since, as I argued in Part I, footnote 4, the very notion of physical or natural law 
becomes empty of content unless we stipulate that a law must have a certain 
inherent simplicity, coherence or nonaberrance. And of course, finally, the fact that 
scientists invariably ignore, in an entirely a priori fashion, an infinity of aberrant 
theories, just as empirically successful as, or even more empirically successful than, 
the best chosen theory, indicates dramatically the all pervasive influence of simplicity 
considerations in science. 
No one, then, can deny that the persistent search for simplicity, unity, coherence, 
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intelligibility, etc., in some sense of these terms constitutes an enormously important 
part of scientific inquiry. Everyone must agree that it is both meaningful and true to 
say that science seeks simplicity, unity, etc., in some sense of these terms. To confess 
that one has no idea at all what these terms may mean in the context of scientific 
inquiry is simply to confess one's ignorance of the realities of the scientific enter- 
prise. 
The task that lies before us, then, is not to define 'intelligibility' from scratch, as 
it were, as if we had before us an entirely uninterpreted term to which some kind of 
meaning had to be assigned out of the blue. Rather, the task is to uncover and solve 
the problems that our intuitive notion of intelligibility-unquestionably of supreme 
importance for science-runs into. We need to articulate and overcome the objec- 
tions that appear to lie in the way of the truism: "It is both meaningful and true to 
say that science seeks to discover intelligibility inherent in phenomena." 
Let us consider, then, why it is that so many scientists and philosophers of 
science find the whole idea of science seeking simplicity, unity, intelligibility, etc., 
highly problematic. Why is there quite general puzzlement as to what "simplicity" 
etc. can mean in a scientific context? 
There are, I suggest, at leastfour reasons for this. 
(i) In preferring simple, coherent, unifying, intelligible theories to complex, 
ugly, incoherent, unintelligible, aberrant theories in an entirely a priori fashion, 
we are, it seems, presupposing, in an a priori fashion, that the world itself is 
simple, coherent, intelligible etc. rather than complex, unintelligible, aberrant. 
But, according to orthodox views about science, it is the very essence of being 
"scientific" that one does not make permanent a priori presuppositions about 
the world. Acceptance of standard conceptions of scientific propriety thus 
render the thesis that science seeks intelligibility profoundly problematic. 
There appears to be no conceivable rationale for committing science to the 
search for intelligibility (as opposed to the search for truth, or for empirical 
growth per se). 
(ii) Simplicity, coherence, unity, harmony, beauty, intelligibility appear to be 
essentially subjective, aesthetic features of theories. The idea that simplicity 
criteria play an important role in assessing the acceptability of theories in 
science thus appears to undermine the essential objectivity of science. 
(iii) Some of the most important contributions to physics have consisted of 
theories widely judged to give a thoroughly unintelligible picture of the universe. 
In fact, it may almost seem that as physics has progressed, our view of the 
physical universe has become more and more strange and bizarre. There 
appears to be, then, a major objection to the idea that physics seeks intel- 
ligibility, progress in physics depending on whether or not our fundamental 
theories become more and more intelligible. 
(iv) It is completely unclear how one is to distinguish between mere termino- 
logical simplicity or unity, which can always be procured in an entirely routine 
fashion, and is quite without significance for science, and genuine or-as we 
may call it-semantic simplicity, which is of real import for science. 
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Let us see whether these four problems can be resolved. 
The first problem is easily solved: all we need do is reject standard empiricism 
and accept aim oriented empiricism in its stead! 
As long as we retain some form of standard empiricism, there would appear to 
be no satisfactory solution to the problem. For according to standard empiricism, 
the fundamental aim of science is to discover more and more about the world as 
such (or about the phenomena as such) without making any permanent a priori 
presuppositions about the nature of the world (or the phenomena). On this view, 
it must be the very essence of being scientific that permanent a priori presuppositions 
about the world are not made. But, as we saw in Part I, to place a premium on 
simple, coherent, intelligible theories, to the extent of just ignoring empirically 
successful complex, incoherent, aberrant theories is in effect to presuppose, in a 
permanent a priori fashion, that Nature herself is simple, coherent, intelligible. 
Within the confines of standard empiricism there can be no satisfactory way of 
reconciling the search for truth per se with the search for intelligibility. The more 
weight we give to the idea that pure science is a passionate, singleminded search for 
explanations, for intelligibility, so, according to standard empiricism, the more 
irrational and unscientific science must become. Just that which constitutes 
science's greatest glory is for standard empiricism one of the more disreputable and 
problematic aspects of the scientific enterprise-an embarrassment to be "explained 
away." 
As long as we retain the basic tenet of standard empiricism, the only way to 
lessen the severity of this fundamental problem is, in general terms, to hold that 
science seeks to explain, seeks to discover intelligibility, in the weakest, the least 
demanding, sense of these terms possible. The more nearly science forgoes the 
search for explanations, the more nearly science becomes merely an attempt to 
predict more and more phenomena per se, the more rational and scientific science 
will be, according to standard empiricism. And if we look at the main philosophical 
views about the nature of scientific inquiry and scientific knowledge, what we see is 
precisely a number of ingenious attempts to "explain away" the search for explana- 
tion, for intelligibility. (This is true even of Kant, since Kant entirely excludes the 
possibility that science might discover intelligibility inherent in the real, noumenal 
world.) The Popperian school, for example, seeks to explicate "simplicity" or 
"explanation" in terms of high empirical content ([14], pp. 136-145), or in terms of 
the capacity of a research program successfully to anticipate novel phenomena 
([8], pp. 173-176). Conventionalism and logical empiricism seek to reduce the 
search for explanation to a search for convenient systematization of the empirical 
content of science which, it is held, is embodied entirely in the sum total of accepted 
empirical laws. 
The moment we reject standard empiricism, and accept aim oriented empiricism 
in its stead, the whole problem situation is, however, dramatically changed. For 
according to aim oriented empiricism, the thesis that science seeks intelligibility 
does not threaten to undermine the rationality of science but, on the contrary, lies 
at the very heart of the rationality of science. The stronger, the more demanding, 
the more important the sense in which science seeks to discover intelligibility, so the 
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more rational science becomes. There is, then, an important sense in which the 
notions of "explanation," "simplicity," "unity," "intelligibility," etc., are indeed 
highly problematic if we accept standard empiricism, but cease to be problematic 
if we accept aim oriented empiricism. 
To some extent, the second problem concerning the inevitable subjectivity of 
intelligibility is also to be resolved by rejecting standard empiricism and accepting 
aim oriented empiricism in its stead. As long as standard empiricism is accepted, 
as long as we hold that the fundamental aim of science is to discover truth per se, it 
is very difficult to see how such quasi-evaluative, aesthetic, emotive considerations 
as beauty, simplicity, harmony, can conceivably play any rational role in science at 
all. If our basic aim is to discover truth per se then all such subjective considerations 
ought, from a rational standpoint, to be ruthlessly excluded from science altogether. 
If we adopt aim oriented empiricism, however, all this is quite different. Accord- 
ing to aim oriented empiricism, if pure science is to be a rational enterprise it is 
absolutely essential that that which we seek in pursuing science should be something 
that we passionately hope to find, and hold to be of supreme intellectual value. 
According to aim oriented empiricism, a science denuded of all human feelings and 
values could not conceivably be rational. It is, in other words, absolutely essential 
to the rationality of science that science seeks to discover "beauty" or "harmony" 
in Nature in a sense which can move our hearts! 
But this is not to say that objectivity must be abandoned. According to aim 
oriented empiricism objectivity is indeed a vital aspect of science. For in pursuing 
scientific inquiry, our concern is not merely to procure the experience, the hallucina- 
tion one might say, of perceiving beauty or intelligibility in the world; our passion- 
ate concern is to discover intelligibility which really does exist inherent in the world. 
We are all too aware of how easy it is to have a very powerful and apparently 
wholly convincing experience of perceiving intelligibility in the world (a multitude 
of different ideas all apparently falling into place to form a coherent whole), arising 
from all kinds of fortuitous causes. Just because it is so easy to be deluded in this 
field, we subject our "experiences" of perceiving intelligibility to fierce inter- 
personal criticism and reappraisal. At the heart of science there is a kind of agonized 
scepticism concerning the authenticity of personal experiences of illumination, and 
out of this scepticism comes the essentially interpersonal, objective character of 
science. Thus according to aim oriented empiricism, the demand for objectivity in 
science should not lead us to reject the personal, the emotional and the evaluative 
altogether; rather the demand for objectivity arises out of a concern that we should, 
insofar as this is possible, discover intelligibility which does actually, objectively 
exist in the world, there being, as a result, a concern to subject our own personal, 
individual experiences of perceiving order and harmony in the world to objective, 
interpersonal criticisms and checks. 
There is, however, a second and perhaps even more important interpretation to 
be put upon the demand for objectivity, from the standpoint of aim oriented 
empiricism. We may regard the demand for objectivity as itself an intelligibility 
requirement. 
The point can be put like this. If there is one person-such as God-who has a 
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very special status in the universe, then it is understandable that the universe is 
intelligible in terms of that person's own personal standards of intelligibility. Like- 
wise, if there is a very special group of people, with a special cosmic status, then it is 
understandable that the universe should be intelligible in terms of the group's 
particular culture and standards of intelligibility. But if we deny the existence of 
any such cosmically preferred people, then it becomes clear that it would be very odd 
indeed-in fact incomprehensible-if the universe were so structured that quite 
arbitrarily it only made sense to one particular group of people with their own 
rather idiosyncratic ideas about what is intelligible, and what is unintelligible. Once 
we acknowledge that there are no cosmically preferred people, it becomes clear that 
the universe can only be intelligible if it is at least potentially intelligible to all 
people, and not only intelligible to a particular group of people who happen to live 
during a particular epoch, with a particular culture, on a particular planet, with such 
and such a neurological make up. 
Thus we see that the requirement that intelligibility criteria be objective is itself 
an intelligibility requirement. In certain respects intelligibility is a more funda- 
mental feature of science than is objectivity. The demand for objectivity is to a 
considerable extent to be understood in terms of the more fundamental demand for 
intelligibility. This simple consideration shows that it is completely unrealistic to 
argue that the requirement that scientific knowledge must be objective must lead us 
to banish intelligibility as a basic requirement from science, on the grounds that 
intelligibility must be irredeemably subjective. 
If we look at the actual development of human knowledge, one of the most 
moving and dramatic features of the whole story is the long painful way in which 
highly parochial, egocentric, anthropomorphic ideas of intelligibility have been 
slowly made a little less parochial, a little less egocentric and anthropomorphic. 
One sees this in the realization that the particular affairs of the tribe may not be of 
cosmic significance, and hence ought not legitimately to be used in order to explain 
cosmic occurrences. It is implicit in the idea that the earth might not after all be at 
the center of the cosmos. It lies behind the seventeenth century distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities, and the demand that explanations should be 
couched only in terms of the former. (Secondary qualities are of importance only 
to human beings, with their own highly specialized sensory apparatus and nervous 
system; beings with a different neurological make up could not become aware of 
"our" secondary qualities. Thus if a theory is to be objective-and hence intelligible 
-it ought not to make any reference to merely "human" secondary qualities.) 
The search for increasing objectivity, and hence increasing intelligibility, can 
perhaps be seen to lie behind the Galilean idea that uniform motion is relative, not 
absolute, which denies the fundamental and egocentric Aristotelian idea that the 
earth is absolutely at rest, and thus constitutes a privileged reference frame. Ein- 
stein's bold generalization of the Galilean idea, embodied in his general principle 
of relativity, can be seen as a continuation of the same theme, in that Einstein's 
principle obviates the need to postulate a unique set of inertial frames of reference. 
Thus the search for standards of intelligibility which are as unparochial as 
possible, which can be appreciated by the widest possible range of possible beings, 
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and not merely by human beings from a particular culture, is a fundamental feature 
of the development of knowledge. 
The idea that objectivity is itself an intelligibility requirement has one extremely 
important consequence, namely this: the more intelligible things become, the more 
unfamiliar they ought to become. There is a widespread idea that to explain, to 
render intelligible, is to reduce the unfamiliar to the familiar. But the familiar is 
almost bound to be the parochial, the anthropomorphic, the culturally and socially 
egocentric; and all this means-once we grant that objectivity is an essential 
intelligibility requirement-that a theory which reduces the unfamiliar to the familiar 
will be highly unsatisfactory as a good explanatory theory. Implicit in the very idea 
of rendering things (objectively) intelligible or comprehensible is the idea that the 
more intelligible our theories become, so the stranger, the less familiar they will 
become. This has an important bearing on how we assess the progress of physics 
viewed as an attempt to discover intelligibility inherent in the world. If we adopt 
the widespread view that to explain, to render intelligible and comprehensible 
involves reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar, then we shall also adopt the wide- 
spread view that as physics has progressed things have become more and more 
unintelligible and inexplicable, our current theories being better explanatory 
theories only in the technical sense of being theories which successfully predict 
more phenomena. The view advocated here-namely that physics seeks increasing 
intelligibility-will seem bizarre in the extreme, and will appear to be decisively 
refuted by the actual development of physics. All this is, however, a mistake. It 
is entirely wrong to suppose that increasing intelligibility involves increasing 
familiarity. As we have seen, just the reverse of this is the case. A necessary con- 
dition for the universe to be (objectively) intelligible is that it should be very, very 
strange. 
Recently, J. Wheeler was quoted as saying: "The universe is far stranger and 
more beautiful than we realize, and also far more simple. But we have no hope of 
seeing how simple it is until we first recognize how strange it is." This remark sums 
up the case for aim articulation and aim improvement quite beautifully. Inherent 
in the very idea of the world being ultimately intelligible (beautiful, simple, 
harmonious, etc.), is the idea that the world is ultimately very strange (since that 
which is objectively intelligible will automatically be highly unfamiliar). Our auto- 
matic intuitions as to what is intelligible or comprehensible are thus not to be 
trusted, since these intuitions are almost bound to confuse intelligibility with its 
opposite, familiarity. We need to subject our ideas of intelligibility to lengthy 
rational criticism and objective appraisal, in order to strip away the merely familiar, 
and arrive at that which is both highly unfamiliar and truly intelligible. Here is 
perhaps the most powerful argument for the potential fruitfulness of aim articula- 
tion and aim improvement. 
Let us now see whether we can make a little more precise and explicit what we 
ought to mean by "simplicity" or "intelligibility" etc., at least as far as these 
notions arise in the context of physics. Before we attempt to do this however, it is of 
decisive importance that we become quite clear as to what criteria we want a 
satisfactory theory of simplicity or intelligibility to fulfill-otherwise we shall spend 
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our time looking in the wrong direction, searching for something that we do not 
really want at all. 
Here are seven desiderata that a theory of simplicity or intelligibility ought, I 
suggest, ideally to satisfy. 
(a) A number of terms tend to be used in the context we are talking about, 
namely: 'simplicity', 'coherence', 'unity', 'orderliness', 'lawfulness', 'harmony', 
'beauty', 'explanatoriness', 'intelligibility'. In Part I I suggested that there is an 
intuitive connection between these ideas. Ideally, however, we want one single clear 
intuitive idea, clearly at the heart of the aims of physics, from which all these other 
ideas can be seen to follow. If we have this, then we have available the possibility of 
improving and developing our ideas of simplicity, intelligibility, etc., in a rational 
fashion, as physics proceeds, since the fixed basic idea may provide the means for 
assessing the relative merits of different interpretations of 'simplicity', 'harmony', 
'beauty', etc. 
(b) The theory should satisfactorily explicate our intuitive judgments concerning 
simplicity etc., as these arise in the context of physical inquiry and the history of 
physics. 
(c) The theory should satisfactorily explain why we judge the discovery of simplicity, 
intelligibility, etc., to be so supremely important, to have such supreme intellectual 
value. This is essential if we are to exhibit physics as a rational enterprise. 
(d) The theory should enable us to distinguish clearly between mere terminological 
simplicity, which is relatively unimportant, and semantic simplicity, which is of 
genuine value for physics. 
(e) The theory must fit in with the important requirement that intelligibility must be 
objective-and with the idea that objectivity is itself in part an intelligibility 
requirement. 
(f) The theory must articulate a notion of intelligibility which satisfies the apparently 
hopelessly contradictory requirements of being both extremely flexible and extremely 
precise. Let me explain. To propose that physics should seek simplicity or intel- 
ligibility or understanding in some more or less definite sense of these terms is, as 
we have seen, to propose that physics should have a more or less definite, fixed, 
permanent aim or metaphysical blueprint-a blueprint for the construction of all 
possible, more specific blueprints for physics, as it were. We have here, then, some- 
thing like the fulfillment of the rationalist's dream: to propose that we ought to 
mean such and such by 'understanding' or 'intelligibility' as far as physics is 
concerned is, inevitably, at one and the same time, to propose that the Ultimate, 
Comprehensive, True Theory, that the whole of physics seeks is, roughly and 
crudely, of such and such a type. From the mere analysis of what we ought to mean 
by 'understanding' we arrive at our first rough, approximate glimpse of the Ultimate 
Truth! 
This consideration underlines vividly that any proposal as to what 'intelligibility' 
ought to mean in the context of physical inquiry must be put forward in a highly 
tentative fashion, and, at all costs, must not be too precise, too restrictive. It is of 
course essential, if physics is to be rational, that we are able to change, or at least 
modify, our basic blueprint as research proceeds: it is thus essential that any 
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proposal as to what ought to be the permanent, unchanging blueprint of physics is 
extremely imprecise or flexible. 
On the other hand, we do not want our notion of intelligibility to be so vague, so 
imprecise, that no definite rules arise which enable us to appraise the relative 
intelligibility of rival blueprints. 
We thus have the following dilemma. On the one hand, if science is to be rational, 
it is essential that we have a relatively precise notion of intelligibility, permanent 
through all the revolutionary upheavals in physics, continuing through all blue- 
print changes, so that we can rationally assess rival blueprints in an a priori manner 
with respect to their intelligibility. But on the other hand, to propose a specific, 
precise, permanent notion of intelligibility for physics is, ipso facto, to propose a 
more or less precise, specific metaphysical blueprint for physics; and if physics is to 
be rational it is essential that we be able to change the basic blueprint of physics, 
so that we do not have a precise, fixed blueprint. In short, if physics is to be rational 
it is absolutely essential that we both do, and do not, seek intelligibility in a fixed, 
precise sense (which looks almost like a reductio ad absurdum of the thesis that 
physics can be rational!). 
A satisfactory theory of physical intelligibility clearly must somehow resolve this 
central dilemma. It must somehow do justice to both of the ostensibly contra- 
dictory requirements: extreme flexibility and extreme precision. I suggest that the 
theory to be sketched here does succeed in satisfying this all important, central 
requirement. 
(g) A satisfactory theory of simplicity or intelligibility ought to enable us to appraise 
not merely the relative intelligibility of rival blueprints, but also the relative 
simplicity, coherence or unity of rival physical theories. 
At first sight it might seem that once the basic tenets of aim oriented empiricism 
are accepted, as outlined in sections 6 to 11 above, then a theory of simplicity for 
scientific theories is no longer required, at least in the sense of havingfixed, general 
criteria of simplicity. For of course, according to aim oriented empiricism, ideals 
of simplicity or intelligibility (as far as theories are concerned) are at any stage 
enshrined in the chosen blueprint of that science. And if the science is to proceed 
rationally then it is essential that the chosen blueprint changes and hopefully 
improves as the science develops. And as the blueprint changes, so too will the 
appropriate level 2 simplicity or intelligibility rules of theory acceptance change as 
well. Thus, if science is to proceed rationally, it is essential that level 2 simplicity 
criteria (for theories) change, both from science to science at a given time, and 
within one science from one time to another. Traditional attempts to develop fixed, 
general criteria of simplicity for theories-such as that made by Goodman [5]- 
seem, then, to be seriously misguided, in that such attempts do not take into account 
the rational need for science to have changing, evolving standards of simplicity or 
intelligibility for theories. 
However, even though we grant all this, it must also be conceded that as far as 
the natural sciences are concerned, at least, it seems to be the case that we prefer 
simple theories (in some sense of 'simple') in a way which is indifferent to, or over- 
rides, changes of blueprint. Given a definite blueprint for physics, such as the 
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corpuscular hypothesis, or Einstein's unified field blueprint, and a list of corres- 
ponding level 2 intelligibility criteria, then it will, it seems, always be possible to 
develop an indefinite number of theories compatible with such intelligibility 
conditions, most of which would, however, be wholly unacceptable in an entirely 
a priori fashion in that the systems of equations involved would be incredibly 
complex. At once we are confronted by the traditional problem of distinguishing 
between genuine and merely terminological simplicity. An adequate theory of 
simplicity or intelligibility, put forward within the context of aim oriented empiri- 
cism, clearly must be able to resolve this problem. 
Let us see, then, whether we can sketch a theory of intelligibility which satisfies 
the above seven requirements. 
13. The Search for Understanding in Physics. A key intuitive idea behind the search 
for intelligibility or understanding in physics is, I suggest, that in seeking to under- 
stand we seek to discover why things are, in some sense, necessarily the way they 
are and not some other way. Given that some state of affairs changes in time, we 
wish to understand why that state of affairs changes in just this way, and not in 
some other way that we can imagine. Given that objects of some common type can 
be found to have different properties or features, we wish to understand why these 
objects have just these different properties or features, and not others that we can 
conceive of. We seek to "understand" change and diversity by attempting to dis- 
cover some property or feature which is invariant through change, which is 
common to the diversity, and which can only exist if the change occurs in precisely 
the way in which it does. Or, in other words, we seek to discover a fixed pattern in 
events, a pattern which would be utterly disrupted if the events were to occur in 
any way other than the way in which they do. (A pattern is, of course, just some- 
thing that is invariant under certain transformations or changes.) It is precisely by 
discovering such fixed patterns in phenomena, such invariant, persistent features 
through change and diversity, which cannot exist unless the changes occur in just 
the way in which they do, that we are able to see why it is that, in a sense, events 
could not occur in a way other than the way that they do, so that there is a kind of 
necessity to the way in which events unfold. In fact, given that there really does 
exist an invariant property of the required type, then, relative to this, the changes 
will be necessary in a strictly logical sense. (For a brief sketch of the essentialist con- 
ception of science that is in effect being appealed to here, see [9], reprinted in [16].) 
Having discovered a pattern in a range of phenomena, at once we have, of course, 
the further problem of understanding why there should be just this pattern, this 
invariant feature, here, and not some other pattern, some other invariant feature. 
Here again, we seek to discover why things cannot be other than the way they are 
by attempting to discover a higher level common pattern encompassing ostensibly 
different patterns. We seek to discover how one known pattern can be transformed 
into other known patterns, the manner of such transformations being such, how- 
ever, that there is a further pattern inherent in these changes of pattern, which 
would be destroyed if these changes were to occur in a way even slightly different 
from the way in which they do occur. 
274 
THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
Consider for example the Galilean law of free fall. This in effect asserts that 
throughout an object's changes of position and changes of velocity during free fall 
(in a vacuum) there is something constant and invariant, namely the acceleration of 
the object: furthermore, if the object were to change its position and velocity in 
any way other than the way in which it does, this invariant feature would be des- 
troyed. To this extent, then, this law enables us to understand why the object falls 
as it does. But of course the value of Galileo's law does not stop here: for the law 
asserts the invariance of acceleration through a vast number of changes, namely 
changes of locality, time, shape, weight, chemical composition, in addition to 
changes of height and velocity. The capacity to fall with constant acceleration thus 
persists through an immensely wide range of changes, and herein lies at least one 
reason for the enormous importance of the law, granted that our concern is to 
"understand" in the general sense being explicated here. (The fact that the law 
refers to a specific object-the earth-and is thus not a law at all in the conventional 
sense is a matter of relative unimportance when this is compared with the univer- 
sality of the law in other respects.) 
Given Galileo's law of free fall, however, it is natural to ask: Why is the accelera- 
tion of objects just 32 ft. per sec.2, and not half or double this value, for example? 
And why is the acceleration constant, and not the velocity, or the change of accelera- 
tion with time? In order to answer these further problems of understanding, we 
need to discover what freely falling objects near the surface of the earth have in 
common with other moving objects, such as planets moving round the sun. 
Newton's laws, of course, provide us with far deeper understanding by specifying 
what is invariant through all moving objects everywhere-namely for any two 
objects of any masses M1 and M2 at any distance d apart, F = GM1M2/d2. 
Galileo's pattern can (in principle) be changed in at least three ways: by changing 
the mass of the earth; by letting the object fall through more than an infinitely short 
distance; by varying nearby massive bodies other than the earth. Newton's law 
specifies the persistent pattern through these changes. The ultimate hope behind 
the Newtonian-Boscovichean blueprint was of course that all change, including all 
chemical changes, all differences of chemical and physical properties, could be 
understood in terms of one simple, universal pattern: invariant point-atoms change 
their relative positions and motions in a manner precisely determined by the 
common invariant properties of point-atoms, namely the force field surrounding 
each point-atom. According to the Newtonian-Boscovichean blueprint there is in 
reality only an inessential difference between any two events, states of affairs, 
substances, or phenomena in the world; all such differences are due to there being 
different numbers of point-atoms being involved (any two of which are essentially 
alike), differently arranged or in different kinds of relative motion. We can thus say 
that according to the Newtonian-Boscovichean blueprint, any event, sequence of 
events or substance is essentially similar to any other event, sequence of events or 
substance, and it is in this sense that this blueprint specifies one universal fixed 
pattern inherent in Nature. 
Here, then, is what all the different blueprints referred to above have in common: 
each blueprint specifies in very general terms that which is invariant or unchanging 
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through change and diversity, and which is itself responsible for the apparent 
change and diversity. Each blueprint is to be interpreted as specifying in the most 
general terms how things are similar and dissimilar-even those blueprints which 
would ordinarily be held to be grossly "unscientific." To assert that everything 
occurs in order to fulfill the will of God is in effect to specify one invariant feature 
that any two events have in common. 
Given that the permanent and fundamental aim of physics is to discover a 
necessity, a lack of arbitrariness, in ostensibly diverse phenomena, in the sense 
indicated here, we can at once understand why ad hocness or aberrance is abhorred 
in physics, and why physics is committed to a program of overall theoretical 
unification. An ad hoc or aberrant theory is of course a theory which postulates a 
flawed pattern, a uniformity with some arbitrary exception: such a theory fails 
completely to specify anything that is invariant through the change or diversity with 
which the theory deals, and thus fails completely to explain why things cannot be 
otherwise than the way they are. Again, as long as theoretical physics postulates a 
number of distinct patterns (such as the distinct patterns of Maxwell and Newton, 
or quantum theory and general relativity today), there remains the problem of 
understanding why, given one pattern, the other must exist. If, however, we can 
discover a more comprehensive pattern which enables us to see what it is that 
remains invariant in moving from one to the other of the previously discovered 
patterns, then relative to the existence of the more comprehensive pattern, we can 
understand why the previously discovered patterns must be (at least approximately) 
as they are. Ideally we want the more comprehensive pattern to enable us to see how 
one previously discovered pattern can be continuously transformed (in some sense) 
so that it becomes an ostensibly quite different previously discovered pattern (rather 
in the manner in which Newtonian theory enables us to transform Galileo's law so 
that it becomes one or other of Kepler's laws). 
According to this view, then, in seeking understanding physics presupposes that 
there is a comprehensive, overall pattern in Nature, a concealed homogeneity or 
uniformity invariant through all change and diversity, it not being logically possible 
for events to unfold in any way other than the way they do, granted that the postu- 
lated pattern really does exist. Nature is a work of art of great beauty, so much so 
that any one slight detail being a little different would utterly destroy the whole 
effect. This at least is the ideal that physical inquiry hopes to move towards dis- 
covering, contributions to knowledge ultimately being assessed in terms of the 
extent to which they help us move towards realizing this goal. 
But now we run into a difficulty. Intuitively there appears to be a sharp distinction 
between an array of objects (events, sequences of events, properties, substances or 
phenomena) which on the one hand does exhibit a pattern, and on the other hand 
does not. If we imagine a number of samples of possible wall paper patterns, for 
example, it would seem quite clear that we would be able to distinguish 
unambiguously between those samples which exhibit a pattern, those that exhibit 
a flawed pattern, and those that are merely a horrible mess. Unfortunately, it seems 
that, ultimately, a pattern, a uniformity, is something that only has an existence 
relative to certain conventions concerning what is to count as "similar" and "dis- 
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similar." Relative to an appropriate choice of conventions, an appropriate choice 
of what is to count as similar and dissimilar, any kind of chaos can be transformed 
into a beautifully regular pattern exhibiting wonderful homogeneity and uniformity, 
and vice versa. Thus, although at first sight one is inclined to suppose that the 
assertion that there is one fixed comprehensive pattern in all phenomena amounts 
to a substantial assertion, it would seem that the assertion is in fact empty of content. 
At first sight it appears entirely meaningful to draw a sharp and completely general 
distinction between a perfect pattern, and a flawed pattern (a distinction absolutely 
essential to the notion of "necessity" or "nonarbitrariness" being explicated here). 
It would seem, however, that no such general distinction can be drawn, since an 
array of events or phenomena that exhibits a flawed pattern, from one point of 
view, can always be transformed into a perfect and beautiful pattern, from a some- 
what different point of view. Or, in other words, an aberrant theory, which is 
beautifully simple apart from one entirely ad hoc, arbitrary "flaw," can, it seems, 
always be transformed into a simple and nonaberrant theory by the introduction of 
new terminology, corresponding to new conventions as to what is to count as 
similar and dissimilar. 
One might try to overcome this objection by developing a purely formal, abstract 
theory of patterns which somehow succeeds in making a completely general, 
abstract distinction between "real" patterns and "pseudo" patterns. I do not 
believe, however, that such a thing can be done. The notion of "pattern," of some- 
thing being "invariant" through change or diversity, only becomes meaningful, I 
believe, relative to more or less specific conventions concerning similarity and dis- 
similarity, however general and abstract these conventions may be. 
Thus it seems that in order to make sense of the thesis that there is a fixed 
universal "pattern" inherent in phenomena (the world being ultimately "intelligi- 
ble") we need to specify the kind of way in which things are ultimately similar and 
dissimilar. But how can we do this ? If we grant that the universe is ultimately intel- 
ligible (in the intuitive sense we are attempting to explicate) then it is entirely 
reasonable to suppose that we do not at present know how things ultimately are 
similar and dissimilar-with respect to which all phenomena can in principle be 
seen to fall into a beautifully simple pattern. Even such basic ideas as that the 
geometry of space is Euclidean, or that the geometry of space-time is Riemannian, 
or that space-time is continuous and simply connected, are suspect. 
Clearly the kind of thing we need to do in order to overcome this problem is to 
specify some particular conventions, C, as to how things are ultimately similar and 
dissimilar, and then specify a set of rules, R, which lay down certain restrictions on 
the ways in which C can be modified, so that C and R together in effect specify a 
restricted set of conventions. The assertion that the universe is intelligible then 
becomes: there exist conventions C' which can be arrived at from C by applying 
the rules R, all phenomena occurring in accordance with some beautifully simple 
pattern with respect to the conventions C'. In this way we can hope to articulate a 
notion of "pattern" (and thus of "intelligibility") which can be formulated in terms 
of the concepts and theories available to us today, a notion which is, nevertheless, 
sufficiently flexible to allow for fundamental conceptual and theoretical innovation, 
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without thereby becoming so flexible as to be entirely meaningless. This kind of 
procedure for explicating a notion of "intelligibility" clearly leaves room for 
immense flexibility. At one extreme, we might interpret the rules R in such a way 
that any group C' of conventions is legitimate as long as it is possible for us to 
specify these conventions, in a finite amount of time, given our present methods for 
introducing and specifying new ideas, new concepts, new conventions (whatever 
precisely these methods may be). As long as we allow that we can meaningfully and 
consistently refer to possible conventions that we cannot possibly in fact "specify," 
"formulate" or "construct," then the above loosest possible interpretation of 
intelligibility will still be extremely restrictive in that there will be an infinity of 
possible universes that will be unintelligible. It would seem desirable, however, to 
explicate a notion of intelligibility that is far, far more restrictive than this extreme 
of flexibility. It would seem reasonable to demand that for the universe to be 
"intelligible" it is necessary for it to be intelligible with respect to conventions 
concerning similarity and dissimilarity which are in some way a generalization and 
objectivization of the conventions we uphold now. In other words, given that we 
interpret present day possible blueprints for physics as in effect specifying con- 
ventions of similarity and dissimilarity that we uphold at the moment, then, for the 
universe to be intelligible in an extremely restrictive sense, we require that there is 
some generalization and objectivization of present blueprint ideas with respect to 
which all phenomena fall into a beautifully simple "pattern." 
The claim that I wish to make is that the conception of "intelligibility" that I have 
very roughly indicated here gives every hope-when further developed and 
articulated-of satisfying all the desiderata spelled out above. In particular, this 
notion of intelligibility succeeds in meeting condition (f) above, in that it succeeds 
in meeting the apparently hopelessly contradictory requirements of being both 
extremely flexible and extremely precise. The all important point here is this. We 
may have considerable freedom in considering various possible candidates for 
similarity and dissimilarity conventions, C1, C2, C3, etc. But if a given set of con- 
ventions C, is to be an acceptable candidate for the conceptual foundations of 
physics, highly exacting, fixed, a priori requirements must be satisfied. It must be 
the case that with respect to Cn, only relatively few, beautifully simple patterns can 
be formulated-so that relative to C, there is a sharp distinction between perfect 
patterns on the one hand, and flawed patterns or chaos on the other hand. In other 
words, for C, to be an acceptable possible conceptual foundation for physics, it 
must be the case that only relatively few comprehensive theories are possible which 
take on a dazzlingly simple form when formulated in terms of the conventions, or 
terminology, of Cn. The notion of intelligibility indicated here is thus highly 
flexible, in that it allows for fundamental conceptual change and revolution, and at 
the same time is highly restrictive, in that a fixed, extremely exacting requirement 
is placed upon any proposed fundamental conceptual scheme for physics. In 
addition, the notion of intelligibility indicated here enables us to understand, quite 
naturally, the enormously important role that "simplicity" plays in physics, and 
enables us, as we shall see, to differentiate between genuine simplicity and mere 
terminological simplicity. 
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We have arrived, then, at a position which gives a fundamentally new interpre- 
tation to the notion of "blueprint" in physics. So far, a blueprint has been quite 
simply a rather vague, imprecise sketch of the ideal future physical theory. For a 
physical theory T to be acceptable, relative to the acceptability of a blueprint M, 
we required simply that T be compatible with M-T, in effect, being a precise, 
testable version of M. This conception of the role of the "metaphysical blueprint" 
in physics then led us straight to the problem of what precisely it could mean to say 
that a blueprint M "enshrines" or "embodies" our ideals of intelligibility for 
physics-and in particular, the problem of how rival blueprints can be compared 
with respect to their intelligibility. The viewpoint that has been developed in this 
section adds a whole new dimension to the role of the "blueprint" in physical 
inquiry. According to our present position, a blueprint M, in specifying in com- 
pletely general, comprehensive terms how things are similar and dissimilar, is to be 
interpreted as in effect specifying a set of conventions, C, with respect to which all 
natural phenomena can be seen to fall into a beautifully simple "pattern." In other 
words, in advocating that M is the ideal blueprint for physics, we are advocating 
that if we develop terminology, tM, specifically designed to be especially appropriate 
to M, so that the similarities and dissimilarities, the universal invariances, postu- 
lated by M, are mirrored in the terminology tM, then a beautifully simple, com- 
prehensive true theory T can be formulated in terms of tM. The terminology tM in 
effect embodies conventions concerning similarity and dissimilarity with respect to 
which the idea of "pattern" takes on a meaning. And for there to be a universal 
pattern in phenomena, in this sense, it is necessary that there should be a com- 
prehensive true theory T which takes on an especially simple form when formulated 
in terms of tM. Thus for a theory T to be acceptable, relative to a blueprint M, we 
require far, far more than merely that T should be compatible with M, or should be 
a precise, testable version of M. We require that T should attribute a simple pattern 
to phenomena, when formulated in terms of terminology especially appropriate 
to M. And a blueprint M embodies ideals of intelligibility in physics precisely via 
this extremely restrictive relationship that a theory must have to M, to be acceptable. 
14. The Simplicity of Theories. The basic idea of the theory of simplicity hinted at 
in the last paragraph is that genuine or semantic simplicity is a property, not of a 
theory T on its own, but rather of a theory T relative to a blueprint M. As a first 
approximation, we may explicate the notion of semantic simplicity like this. We 
have, let us suppose, a blueprint M, and a number of interpreted languages or 
terminologies L1, .. . L,, each of which is more or less "especially appropriate" (in 
a sense to be discussed below) for the formulation of the main tenets of M. For T 
to have semantic simplicity (relative to M) we require that T takes on an especially 
simple form, i.e. has terminological simplicity, when formulated in one or other of 
L1,. .. Ln. Or, as a slight refinement, for T to have semantic simplicity we require 
that T becomes more and more terminologically simple as it is formulated in 
languages more and more "especially appropriate" to M. By 'terminological 
simplicity', here, we may mean something quite crude such as that the fewer the 
number of symbols in an expression so the greater the terminological simplicity of 
279 
NICHOLAS MAXWELL 
the expression (though no doubt this crude notion can be made more sophisticated). 
The semantic notion of simplicity to be advocated here is thus explicated via the 
purely syntactical notion of terminological simplicity. The semantic notion is, 
however, itself a nonsyntactical notion. Semantic simplicity is a property of a pair 
of propositions Tand M (or a property of one proposition T relative to a second M) 
entirely independent of all questions of what language or terminology T and M are 
formulated in. The question of whether or not T has semantic simplicity, relative 
to M, concerns the question of whether it is possible to have a language "especially 
appropriate" to M in terms of which T may be formulated with terminological 
simplicity; and the answer we receive to this question is entirely unaffected by what 
language we formulate T and M in when asking the question. 
Essentially the same point may be put in a slightly different fashion, as follows. 
The fact that the theory being advocated here explicates semantic simplicity via the 
purely syntactical notion of terminological simplicity does not constitute a defect 
of the theory for the following reason. The basic problem that a theory of simplicity 
has to solve is to specify the circumstances under which terminological simplicity 
is an indication of genuine simplicity, and the circumstances under which it is 
nothing of the kind (terminological simplification being merely terminological). It 
is precisely this problem that the theory being proposed here succeeds in solving. 
If a theory T becomes more and more terminologically simple as a result of being 
formulated in languages more and more "especially appropriate" to an acceptable 
blueprint M, then this terminological simplification represents genuine or semantic 
simplification. Otherwise such simplification is merely terminological (and in all 
probability is of no significance for science). 
Terminological simplification can always be achieved. However complex and 
intricate a theory may be, by introducing appropriate abbreviations, it can always 
be reduced to an ideally simple form, such as 'A = 0'. Semantic simplification, 
however, cannot so lightly be achieved. Given any theory, T, however complex, 
then, if we are free to choose an appropriate M, we can no doubt always construct 
a language especially appropriate to (an appropriately chosen) M, so that T comes 
out as 'A = O'. But if we are presented with a specific T and a specific M, so that 
we are no longer free to choose M as we please, then our hands are more or less 
tied; it will not, in general, be the case that T takes on a simpler and simpler form 
as it is formulated in languages more and more appropriate to M. 
Let us now look at the all important question of what it means to say that a 
language or terminology is "especially appropriate" to a blueprint M, or that 
languages LI, L2, ... are increasingly "appropriate" to M. Roughly speaking, we 
need to find some way of picking out those languages which might be invented to 
formulate the basic tenets of M in complete ignorance of any specific theory T, so 
that no special terms are introduced designed specifically to reduce a complex T to 
an artificially simple form. 
A blueprint M can be regarded as specifying certain sorts of entities with certain 
sorts of properties. Thus the Boscovichean blueprint postulates three dimensional 
Euclidean space, one dimensional continuous time, and point-atoms which interact 
by means of centrally directed forces which vary in a continuous fashion with 
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distance. The blueprint of general relativity postulates the four dimensional con- 
tinuum of space-time, gravitation being a geometrical feature of this continuum, 
produced by mass-energy. 
A language or terminology especially appropriate to a blueprint M clearly must 
include the means to refer to the sorts of entities specified by M, and the means to 
attribute the specified sorts of properties to these entities. One important restriction 
can however be placed on a language L that is to be especially appropriate to M: 
no extralogical terminology can be introduced which is such that it is possible for 
this terminology not to refer to anything, even though M is true. Thus, given the 
corpuscular hypothesis, we can introduce into a language L especially appropriate 
to this blueprint the terminological means to describe corpuscles of any shape 
whatsoever: we cannot, however, introduce terms that allow us to refer to cor- 
puscles of certain restricted shapes only. (It is assumed here that the corpuscular 
blueprint places no restrictions on the shapes of corpuscles.) 
In setting up languages more or less appropriate to a given blueprint we can 
proceed in stages. At one extreme we may develop a language L whose basic terms 
have meanings which are such that the terms could refer to entities of a far wider 
class than those postulated by the blueprint M. At the other extreme, the meanings 
of the terms of L may be much more tightly restricted so that they refer more or less 
exclusively to entities postulated by M. Thus, given the Boscovichean blueprint, 
our basic spatial terms may not incorporate in their very meaning the idea that 
space is Euclidean-although of course the language would incorporate the means 
to assert that space is Euclidean. A language "more appropriate" to the Bos- 
covichean blueprint, however, would be a language whose basic spatial terms do 
incorporate in their meaning the idea that space is Euclidean, so that in terms of this 
language, the postulates of Euclidean geometry (apart from existence postulates) 
are analytic, and the spatial terms of the language only apply to physical space as 
long as space is Euclidean. Again, granted that the Boscovichean blueprint includes 
the postulate that mass is conserved, we have a choice. On the one hand, in order 
to refer to mass, we may introduce a three place predicate m(x, a, t), taking real 
numbers, point-atoms and times as arguments, and then add the contingent 
postulate that the masses of point-atoms remain constant throughout time. On the 
other hand we may introduce a two place predicate m(x,a), especially tailored to the 
ontology of the Boscovichean blueprint, it being implicit in the very meaning of 
the term 'm( , )' that mass is conserved (so that conservation of mass is analytic). 
The more a language is "especially tailored" to the ontology of a blueprint in the 
above sense, so the more "especially appropriate" we may hold that language to be 
to the blueprint. 
There is another, closely related way in which we may explicate the idea of a 
series of languages L1, L2, ... being more and more "appropriate" to a blueprint. 
The fundamental function of a blueprint, it will be remembered, is to specify that 
which is invariant through all change and diversity: the more precisely a terminology 
itself "mirrors" the invariance postulated by a blueprint, so the more "appropriate" 
that language may be held to be to that blueprint. In other words, a blueprint M 
will give rise to a number of level 2 invariance principles P1,.. . Pn,, which assert 
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that nothing essential is changed by such and such (inessential) changes. A termino- 
logy especially appropriate to M will be a terminology which has built into it the 
invariance principles P1,.. . Pn, so that any specific theory formulated in terms of 
this terminology, will be such that it conforms to P, ... P,, For example, the 
Boscovichean blueprint asserts that space is homogeneous and isotropic, so that a 
change of orientation, position or velocity with respect to space itself, can make no 
physical difference whatsoever. A terminology especially appropriate to the Bos- 
covichean blueprint will be such that theories formulated in terms of this termino- 
logy will have their form entirely unaffected by changes of position, orientation and 
velocity of physical systems with respect to space itself. In other words, for a 
language L to be especially appropriate to a blueprint M, we require the following: 
If M asserts that nothing essential changes through the transformations E -> E2 -> 
E3, ..., then a description of E1, E2, 3, ... in terms of L should be such that these 
descriptions are all essentially the same (terminologically the same, that is). The 
Boscovichean blueprint asserts that stable systems of point-atoms-different 
"molecules"-can be ordered with respect to number of point-atoms involved, 
nothing essential changing from one possible molecule to the next, except for the 
addition of one point-atom. A language especially appropriate to the Boscovichean 
blueprint ought to mirror, terminologically, this important invariance. Again, to 
give a quite different example, once we accept the basic blueprint of general 
relativity, according to which space-time is Riemannian, gravitation being a 
geometrical feature of space-time, then we are committed to the idea that nothing 
essential is changed in moving from one set of continuous coordinate systems to 
another. A terminology that is especially appropriate to the blueprint of general 
relativity must capture this all important idea, and it is precisely this that the tensor 
calculus is designed to do. 
At first sight it might seem that I have given two quite different explications of 
the notion of languages L1, L2,... being "more and more appropriate" to M. For 
the first explication it is required that L1, L2, ... be successively more and more 
precisely tailored to the ontology of M; for the second, it is required that L1, L2,... 
have built into them more and more invariance principles, corresponding to M. I 
suggest however that these two explications are not really all that different. The 
entities postulated by M are entities whose basic properties do not change; in 
developing a language whose basic terms reflect more and more precisely the 
ontology of M, the nature of the basic properties attributed to the entities postulated 
by M, one is automatically, at one and the same time, building into the language 
more and more of the invariance principles corresponding to M. 
The circumstances under which terminological simplification indicates genuine 
or semantic simplification can, then, be specified like this. We have, let us suppose, 
a definite blueprint M, and a succession of languages or terminologies L1, L2,... 
successively more and more appropriate to M. (We assume that L1, L2,... are all 
such that the basic postulates of M get formulated in each language with maximum 
possible terminological simplicity.) If now a theory T takes on a simpler and simpler 
terminological form when formulated successively in Li, L2, ... then, to that extent 
T has semantic simplicity, relative to M. And if, given two different theories T1 and 
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T2, T1 takes on successively a simpler and simpler form when formulated in 
languages L1, L2,..., whereas T2 becomes increasingly terminologically complex, 
then T1 is semantically more simple than T2, relative to M. Simplifying a theory has 
semantic or scientific import when it is achieved as a result of rewriting the theory 
in terminology more especially appropriate to an acceptable blueprint, M; other- 
wise such simplification is without semantic import. 
It may happen, of course, that given some M and T then if we choose languages 
L1, L2,... more and more appropriate to M, T takes on a dazzlingly simple form, 
whereas if we were to choose somewhat different, but equally legitimate languages 
L*, L*,..., T would remain, or would become, extremely complex. In this case, T 
is not semantically simple relative to M. Even worse, it may happen that a blue- 
print is such that it is always possible to construct two or more different languages 
or terminologies especially appropriate to the blueprint, all theories invariably 
being complicated in at least one of these languages. This, as we shall see in the 
next section, is to be judged as a serious flaw in the blueprint, rendering its accept- 
ance highly problematic. 
Perhaps the most striking exemplification of the above notion of semantic 
simplicity is provided by Einstein's general theory of relativity. Once the back- 
ground metaphysical blueprint of general relativity is conceded-that is, once we 
grant the principles of equivalence and covariance, the idea that gravitation is a 
geometrical feature of space-time, the geometry of space-time being Riemannian 
(so that the conceptual apparatus of Riemannian geometry may be incorporated 
into our language)-then the equations of general relativity can be expressed with 
extraordinary (terminological) simplicity. In fact, once we stipulate that the theory 
be generally covariant, that it involve only the metric tensor and various geometrical 
objects obtained from its components and derivatives of these, that the equations 
be of the lowest possible order, and that the stress energy tensor be the source of 
gravitational effects, the Einstein field equations follow uniquely-so beautifully 
does the theory harmonize with its background metaphysical blueprint ([1], p. xix). 
And yet, as Hoffmann amusingly notes: "If written out in full instead of in the 
compact tensor notation, . . . [Einstein's field equations] would fill a huge book 
with intricate symbols" ([6], p. 122). Hoffmann goes on: 
It may seem ridiculous to talk about beauty and near miracle after implying 
that the equations are ugly and cumbersome. Let us therefore ask a question. 
How did Einstein manage to find the equations ? Could he have guessed the 
various terms-hundreds of thousands of them, or in one form, millions, and 
all of them highly unpleasant? Impossible. Then how did he find them? That 
is where the beauty and near miracle come in. For the tensor calculus con- 
tained stringent rules. Einstein imposed, for physical reasons, a few almost 
trifling conditions that, for the most part, had the effect of a request for sim- 
plicity. And when, having done so, he sought ten tensor equations in which 
gravitation would be represented solely by the ten quantities gv, he found that 
his hands were tied. Because of his insistence on simplicity, the tensor calculus 
gave him no choice. The field equations were determined uniquely. In the 
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tensor notation these equations are compact. Their power and their utter 
naturalness in both form and content give them an indescribable beauty. 
Suppose someone had actually written them out in full, term by term. A single 
misprint in the bookful of terms, a 1/2 omitted or a 3 written instead of a 2, and 
the equations would not satisfy the condition of general covariance. ([6], pp. 
122-123) 
Several points vital to the basic themes of this essay emerge from this case of 
general relativity. First, it illustrates with dazzling clarity the thesis that we can 
only expect the fundamental equations of nature to have a "simple" form when 
written in terms of terminology appropriate to the entities of the proper blueprint. 
If formulated in terminology appropriate to some incorrect blueprint, the funda- 
mental laws of nature can be expected to have only an impossibly intricate, complex 
form. This makes clear how vital blueprint articulation is for the progress of science 
-in particular the progress of theoretical physics. As Einstein himself always 
emphasized, if we are bereft of general principles to guide us in our search for new 
theories we simply cannot hope to stumble upon good new theories. In fact we can 
go even further, and say that without the proper blueprint, and hence the proper 
terminology, we could never have any serious reason to suppose we had formulated 
the proper equations even if, as a matter offact we had achieved this! Einstein's field 
equations, written out only in the form of millions of terms, could never be held to 
be confirmed or corroborated since we could never be able to refute all the theories 
-of equal a priori plausibility in this form-which make predictions only slightly 
different from general relativity. If we are to make possible both the discovery of a 
fundamentally new theory, and its verification, it is essential that we hit on the 
appropriate terminology: but we can only hope to do this if we choose the correct 
blueprint, the proper level 2 intelligibility principles. 
In the field of high energy physics today we see precisely a search for appropriate 
symmetry and invariance principles (level 2 intelligibility principles) which in effect 
specify certain sorts of entities with certain sorts of properties, the hope being that 
a terminology, invented to describe these sorts of entities and properties in an 
especially simple, appropriate manner will be a terminology peculiarly appropriate 
to fundamental particle interactions, so that in terms of this terminology it will 
eventually be possible to write down reasonably simple dynamic equations for 
fundamental particle interactions. 
The theory of simplicity sketched here helps perhaps to explain in a rather general 
way, why pure mathematics, pursuing its own ends, has so often generated ideas 
and terminology later on found to be enormously fruitful, if not essential, for 
physics. A pure mathematician such as Riemann [15] can be seen as engaged in the 
task of blueprint articulation and the development of mathematical machinery 
especially appropriate to the new blueprint ideas. No wonder this work turns out 
to be of value for physics. Up until now, however, blueprint articulation by mathe- 
maticians has proceeded in a somewhat fortuitous, hit and miss fashion, as far as 
physics is concerned. We need a much more conscious, deliberate study of blue- 
print problems, devoted especially to blueprints judged to be of relevance to future 
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physical theories, so that new fundamental physical theories may be developed in a 
progressive, rational fashion. 
One needs to search far and wide for a theory as beautiful as general relativity, 
with as explicitly articulated a background blueprint. However, my claim is that 
throughout the field of the natural sciences, in assessing the semantic simplicity of 
a law or theory, invariably there lurk background blueprint assumptions which have 
influenced the choice of appropriate terminology, and in terms of which the law or 
theory has terminological simplicity. The theory of simplicity sketched here applies, 
I suggest, quite generally to physical theory even though it may not always be clear 
precisely what blueprint lies behind a theory, due to the reluctance of scientists to 
articulate blueprints, out of the mistaken idea that to do so is to be metaphysical, 
irrational and unscientific. It may even happen that a given theory has two or more 
distinct blueprints-as in the case of reformulations of Newtonian mechanics in 
terms of least action principles. Such reformulations of a theory, in that they 
provide a new, possible blueprint for the theory, must be regarded as highly 
creative developments, from the present standpoint, possibly effecting future 
developments in physics. The Hamiltonian reformulation of Newtonian theory is a 
case in point, since this has had an important role in the development of quantum 
theory. 
The theory of simplicity sketched here is, of course, not confined to fundamental 
theories in physics. In seeking to develop a new theory in physics which is not of a 
fundamental character, we will of course be faced with a number of constraints: 
first, obvious conservation, invariance and symmetry principles, such as conserva- 
tion of momentum and energy; second, relevant accepted fundamental theories 
(such as quantum theory); third, some specific model we have chosen for the pheno- 
mena under consideration. All these constraints will function as blueprint con- 
siderations; automatically, there will be terminology more or less "especially 
appropriate" to these blueprint considerations, and our task will be to develop a 
theory which has a simple form when expressed in this terminology (and which 
leads to equations that can be solved, a most important additional requirement that 
philosophers of science tend entirely to ignore). 
It is interesting to note that in just the kind of context in which the problem of 
simplicity has often traditionally been considered by philosophers of science-the 
context of drawing a smooth continuous curve through a number of points on a 
graph-inevitably there must lurk in the background certain crucial blueprint ideas 
(though this has not usually been noticed). The point is this. A scientist only expects 
to obtain a "smooth" curve for certain sets of parameters, plotted one against the 
other in a certain manner. Merely in setting up a graph in one way rather than 
another, scientists are in effect accepting certain rather general "blueprint" ideas, 
and are choosing a terminology appropriate to these ideas. The information 
recorded by the smoothest of curves could after all easily be translated into a 
completely wild graph, if one adopted different background concepts. And if one 
chose two parameters at random to plot against each other one would not in 
general expect to obtain a smooth curve. Smooth curves arise relative to the choice 
of definite blueprint ideas, and appropriate terminology. In general terms, the 
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notion of simplicity sketched here seems to apply rather well to this classical 
"curve-fitting" situation. 
15. Rules for the Appraisal of Intelligibility of Blueprints in Physics. At this point 
we really need an illustrative exercise in blueprint articulation. Were there space, I 
would like to provide such an exercise by showing how one can take the corpuscular 
blueprint as one's starting point and then, by considering purely a priori intelligi- 
bility problems inherent in this blueprint, develop in turn Boscovich's point-atom 
blueprint and Einstein's unified field blueprint, in a progressive, rational fashion. 
In addition I would like to show how Einstein may be seen as developing both the 
special and general theories of relativity largely from a consideration of a priori 
intelligibility blueprint problems. In this way I would hope to illustrate and rein- 
force the following three cardinal points. First, the intelligibility of blueprints is a 
topic that can be rationally discussed (without there necessarily being instant deci- 
sive agreement on all issues) even in the absence of fully articulated, agreed rules for 
intelligibility assessment. Second, rational modification and improvement of a blue- 
print can lead to the development of profoundly novel ideas. Third, a self-conscious, 
articulate inquiry into intelligibility problems inherent in possible blueprints for 
physics may have enormously fruitful results in that in this way we may be able to 
develop entirely new fundamental physical theories in a rational and progressive 
fashion. Indeed it would seem (bearing in mind in particular the results of sections 
13 and 14) that the blueprint articulation and improvement must constitute an 
essential preliminary to developing fundamentally new theories: for if our present 
blueprint ideas are false, as we can be reasonably sure they are, then fundamentally 
new physical theories will presumably receive only an impossibly complex form 
when written in terminology appropriate to our present (false) blueprint ideas. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the new fundamental theories we hope to discover in 
physics will only be recognizable as theories at all when we have developed new 
appropriate blueprint ideas. All in all, granted that our concern is to improve our 
understanding of the universe in as rational and successful a fashion as possible, the 
main task that confronts us today is to articulate a reasonably satisfactory unified 
blueprint for physics, and instigate a conscious tradition of discussion of intelligi- 
bility problems of blueprints, as an integral part of physical inquiry itself. 
Unfortunately, there is not space here for an illustrative exercise in blueprint 
articulation. I must rest content with tentatively proposing the following five rules 
for assessing the intelligibility of blueprints (rules which in effect amplify Rule 1 of 
section 11). 
(1A) Adequacy. An acceptable blueprint must be such that it is at least conceivable 
that all relevant phenomena can be explained and understood in terms of the 
blueprint. 
(IB) Objectivity. Given two blueprints B1 and B2, if B1 is intelligible in a more 
objective fashion than B2, then, other things being equal, B1 is to be judged more 
intelligible than B2. 
(1C) Nonarbitrariness. A blueprint which can only be made precise (to form a 
testable physical theory) in an arbitrary fashion, is to be judged to have an intel- 
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ligibility flaw on that account. Or, in other words, if a blueprint B is such that any 
precise version T of B has terminological simplicity only, and not semantic 
simplicity, then to that extent B lacks intelligibility. And on the other hand, a 
blueprint to which there corresponds a uniquely simple physical theory is to be 
judged highly intelligible, other things being equal. 
(ID) Generalization. If B1 is a generalization of B2, so that additional specific 
assumptions need to be added to B1 to obtain B2, then, other things being equal, B1 
is a more intelligible blueprint than B2. In other words, the less specific, the less 
arbitrarily restricted, a blueprint is, so the more intelligible, and acceptable, it 
should be judged to be. (Generality is of course also desirable on purely epistemo- 
logical grounds.) 
(IE) Coherence. Suppose a blueprint consists of two parts, A plus B1, it being 
perfectly possible to construct an indefinite number of blueprints of the type 
A + Bn, where each Bn may differ radically from B1. (An example of this would be 
the Newtonian-Boscovichean blueprint, A, specifying the nature of space-three 
dimensional Euclidean geometry-and B1 specifying the nature of matter, namely 
that matter is made up of point-atoms.) From the point of view developed in section 
13, A + B1 is unsatisfactory on intelligibility grounds in that there is no reason why, 
given A, B1 should be true rather than B2 or B3, etc. Suppose, however, we can 
generalize A to form A* (so that A is just a special case of A*) in such a fashion that 
B1 can be dispensed with without loss of adequacy. In this case A* is to be judged a 
very much more intelligible blueprint that A + B? in that it is a more coherent or 
unified blueprint. One way of assessing the importance of the blueprint changes 
brought about by general relativity is to argue that these changes take us some way 
towards the ideal of dispensing with matter altogether, and regarding matter as an 
aspect of space-a blueprint ideal that has, of course, been advocated and investi- 
gated by Wheeler, [18]. 
There is one point that may perhaps have troubled the reader. Is a blueprint, as 
explicated here, to be understood simply as a rather general untestable theory; or 
is it to be understood as a conceptual scheme or framework, embodying conven- 
tions of similarity and dissimilarity? Ambivalence on this point is deliberate. A 
blueprint begins its life, it would seem, as an attempt to specify concepts which any 
future physical theory must conform to. There is, initially, no idea of how an 
acceptable physical theory could possibly be set up outside the specified conceptual 
framework. The blueprint specifies, in other words, the limits of what is conceivable, 
or imaginable, as far as physics is concerned. But then blueprint developments, 
and in particular mathematical developments, make clear that from a conceptual 
standpoint, the chosen blueprint is simply a rather arbitrary special case of some- 
thing much more general. Three dimensional Euclidean geometry is a special case 
of n dimensional Euclidean geometry. Euclidean geometry is a special case of 
alternative possible geometries, classified either in accordance with Klein's Erlanger 
program, or in accordance with the concepts of Riemannian geometry. And so on. 
From the vantagepoint of the much more general conceptual schemes, the original 
blueprint has become merely a rather imprecise theory. A fundamental task of blue- 
print articulation, then, is to remove arbitrary restrictions on accepted blueprint 
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ideas, that have become apparent as a result of conceptual developments in 
mathematics, at the same time ensuring that the more generalized blueprint 
satisfies the all important requirement of specifying a few semantically simple 
theories (rule 1C). 
16. Implications for Science. The ideas developed in this essay have, I believe, 
important implications not only for our understanding of science, but also for 
scientific practice itself. Aim oriented empiricism implies that the most important 
problem that faces a science at any stage of its development is to articulate possible 
fundamental aims or blueprints for that science, and then choose rationally the best 
possible candidate. It is essential to do this if there is to be rational acceptance of 
theories and a rational development of new theories. Conventional ideas of scientific 
propriety, however, positively discourage all attempts to choose metaphysical 
blueprints in a rational fashion. According to standard empiricism, it is the very 
essence of being scientific that, in the end, all theories, all theses about the world, 
are chosen in the light of purely empirical considerations. To attempt to choose 
rationally between different metaphysical ideas, which cannot be appraised 
empirically, is to cease to do science. It is to take up idle metaphysical speculation. 
The idea that metaphysical ideas may actually be more "firmly established" in a 
science than empirically verified theories, to the extent that if there is a clash 
between the two it may well be a "well established" empirical theory which is 
rejected, and not a metaphysical theory, is complete anathema to conventional 
ideas concerning proper scientific practice. All in all, the widespread acceptance of 
some form or other of standard empiricism, the institutionalization of this view in 
present day scientific practice, does much to discourage just that which we most 
need to do if we are to pursue scientific inquiry in a rational and successful fashion, 
namely constantly to put the chosen aims of a science under overt, explicit rational 
criticism and review. Standard empiricism is, of course, a completely unworkable 
creed; any scientist who tried to pursue science in accordance with the dictates of 
standard empiricism in a completely honest fashion would come to an instant and 
total standstill. At best, scientists only pay lip service to standard empiricism. But 
even this hypocritical allegiance to standard empiricism still has a crippling effect 
on scientific inquiry, for it still prevents scientists from performing the vital task of 
aim articulation, because to do so would be to violate all too obviously and blatantly 
the norms of good scientific behavior embodied in standard empiricism. Upholding 
some version of standard empiricism, most scientists (quite logically) do not believe 
in the possibility of a rational method of scientific discovery: as a result, not 
surprisingly, little attempt is made to develop new theories in a consciously rational 
fashion. The researcher proceeds with his eyes shut. 
For some sciences, the fact that explicit aim articulation is outlawed as scienti- 
fically disreputable does not matter too much. For there are sciences which have 
relatively stable, unproblematic blueprints, consisting of the well established 
theories of some more fundamental science. Chemistry, for example, might be said 
to have quantum mechanics as its blueprint. Here, the incapacity of scientists to 
discuss explicitly metaphysical ideas in a scientific context, does not much matter. 
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In the case of a fundamental science such as physics itself, however, the situation is 
very different. Here blueprint articulation is an absolutely essential task that needs 
to be performed if any fundamental progress is to be achieved-even if this task is 
performed in private, as it were, by one or two individuals away from the critical 
eyes and ears of colleagues. 
As I have tried to indicate during the course of this essay, it is not the case that 
all physicists accept some version or other of standard empiricism. There is at least 
one dazzling exception, namely Einstein. In developing both the special and general 
theories of relativity, Einstein pursued the path of articulating the best, the most 
intelligible aims for physics, thus enabling him to formulate two vital level 2 intelli- 
gibility requirements, namely the restricted principle of relativity, and the principle 
of general covariance, each of which played a vital role in the development of funda- 
mental new theories. Even Einstein's famous 1905 photon hypothesis paper, which 
did so much to assist the birth of quantum mechanics, can be seen as essentially an 
exercise in aim articulation, since one may see the fundamental aim of that paper to 
be that of revealing an unavoidable, deep flaw in the scheme of classical physics 
which must arise when continuous radiation interacts with discrete matter. But 
Einstein did not only do science in accordance with the kind of aim oriented 
empiricist viewpoint advocated here, with quite extraordinary success. 
Furthermore, after 1915, Einstein repeatedly explicitly advocated that theoretical 
physics should be pursued in this kind of way (see Einstein [2], [3]). The fact that 
Einstein's profound and original contributions to physics were developed in accord- 
ance with the rational method of discovery of aim oriented empiricism ought, I 
believe, to count somewhat in favor of this viewpoint. (From my own point of view, 
this success of aim oriented empiricism was entirely unexpected. I developed the 
ideas expressed here in an attempt to solve the Humean rationality problem, at 
first convinced that no scientist would have so violently violated conventional 
standards of good scientific behavior as to have consciously practiced aim oriented 
empiricism. It then gradually began to dawn on me that Einstein had in fact both 
practiced and advocated a position very close to the one put forward here.) 
The extraordinary success of Einstein's new way of doing physics was too striking 
to be altogether ignored. And in fact Einstein's procedure of developing general 
methodological principles, level 2 intelligibility principles, has had a considerable 
impact on physical inquiry. For it was this procedure of Einstein's which led to the 
explicit study of conservation, invariance and symmetry principles, of just the type 
considered by Einstein. (Wigner, who has done much to develop the study of 
invariance and symmetry principles in physics, draws attention to the pioneering 
work of Einstein in this respect: see [19], pp. 5-7, 13, 14-23.) Today, invariance and 
symmetry principles play an increasingly important role in physical inquiry, 
particularly, as one would expect, in those domains of physics, such as fundamental 
particle physics, where fundamental new theories are being sought. A recent text- 
book has, for example, this to say: 
... in particle physics much of our present dynamical theory is incomplete or 
unsatisfactory and it is reasonable to hope that many of the ideas and models 
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will be discarded or radically modified by the end of the century. In contrast, 
the results derived from symmetry theory are believed to be of much more 
permanent value. They are not a substitute for detailed dynamics, but they 
provide constraints which apply to any dynamical theory and their predictions 
can be explored and tested long before the details of such a theory have been 
worked out. Taken collectively, they provide a framework into which any 
subsequent theory must fit and in terms of which one can classify and interpret 
the present mass of experimental data. Thus in particle physics symmetry 
theory offers much more than just a set, however elegant, of insights and short 
cuts. It forms much of the basis on which the whole subject is built. ([4], 
preface) 
Again, Wigner has this to say: 
As far as the physical sciences are concerned, the role of invariance principles 
does not seem to be near exhaustion. We still seem to be far from the "univer- 
sal law of nature." We seem to be far from it, if indeed it exists, and, to para- 
phrase Poincare, the present picture of four or five different types of inter- 
actions, with widely divergent properties, is not such as to permit the human 
mind to rest contented. Hence, invariance principles, giving a structure to the 
laws of nature, can be expected to act as guides also in the future and to help 
us to refine and unify our knowledge of the inanimate world. ([19], p. 36) 
However, despite all this, it is, I believe, important to stress that the Einsteinian 
approach to physics has not been fully exploited by contemporary physicists, 
essentially because the rationale behind Einstein's way of doing physics has not 
been understood. If some version of standard empiricism is accepted, it is very 
difficult to understand the curious status that conservation, invariance and sym- 
metry principles have in physics-partly a priori, partly empirical, in that although 
these principles place restrictions on what is to count as an acceptable, intelligible 
theory, nevertheless these principles may be rejected in the light of empirical 
discoveries (for example, conservation of parity). Aim oriented empiricism, on the 
other hand, actually predicts, from first principles, that a mature science ought to 
have changing, evolving level 2 intelligibility principles. 
According to conventional views of scientific inquiry, there can be no rational 
way in which important new invariance or symmetry principles can be developed 
(which in turn may lead to the rational development of new dynamic theories); 
there can be no rational way in which one can decide to accept or reject a given 
level 2 intelligibility principle, apart from taking into consideration the empirical 
success of a theory which incorporates or fails to incorporate the principle. But it is 
of course the whole essence of aim oriented empiricism that there is a rational (even 
though, of course, fallible and nonmechanical) way in which powerful new 
invariance principles, level 2 intelligibility principles, can be developed and assessed. 
In order to do this we need to articulate a coherent, unified blueprint for physics, 
which may be regarded as a harmonious collection of fundamental invariance 
principles formulated as a metaphysical theory about the nature of the universe; 
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we then seek to resolve awkward intelligibility problems inherent in this blueprint, 
in this way, in an entirely rational fashion developing what may well be a radically 
new blueprint which leads to radically new intelligibility principles and hopefully 
to radically new fundamental physical theories which achieve empirical success. 
It is only against the background of blueprint articulation and improvement that 
we can be in a position to develop new intelligibility principles, and choose between 
rival intelligibility principles in a rational fashion. Only in this way can we build 
into our methodology the all important idea that it is unity, coherence and 
generality that we seek at the most fundamental level of all. Today there is hardly 
an articulate, conscious tradition of blueprint improvement in this sense. And this is 
essentially because the reigning standards of scientific propriety render rational aim 
articulation and improvement an impossible enterprise, a foolish, unscientific 
exercise in metaphysical speculation. That which most needs to be done if we are to 
proceed rationally becomes that which is furthest removed from respectable 
scientific inquiry, once standard empiricism is accepted. 
There are of course noble exceptions! Wheeler ([17], [18]) and Penrose [13], have, 
for example, sought to articulate comprehensive, coherent blueprints for a future 
physics. Such work is, however, generally judged to be essentially speculative, only 
being amenable to scientific assessment if empirical predictions are forthcoming. 
It is not appreciated that rational choice of scientific theory in terms of empirical 
considerations actually presupposes that we can choose rationally, in a more or less 
a priori fashion, between rival blueprints. Rational blueprint choice is essential if 
science is not to drown in an ocean of empirically successful aberrant theories. 
The general neglect of the study of blueprint articulation in physical inquiry has 
led to the extraordinary situation that there is today no even half way acceptable 
unified blueprint for physics. (In this respect the situation is far worse that the 
situation in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when relatively 
intelligible, plausible, unified blueprints for physical inquiry did exist.) It is not 
simply that the two fundamental theories of contemporary physics, namely 
quantum theory and general relativity, fail to fit together harmoniously: much more 
serious is the fact that the fundamental blueprint ideas behind these two theories 
are in violent collision. According to the aim oriented empiricist standpoint, then, 
the vital task for theoretical physics today is not the technical one of uniting 
quantum theory and general relativity by "quantizing" general relativity perhaps: 
rather the task is to articulate the blueprint ideas behind the two theories, and work 
out how these blueprint ideas can be modified so as to form a more general, 
nonarbitrary, conceptual unity. Only then can we be in a position seriously to 
contemplate developing a new unified fundamental theory. 
Very tentatively, I would suggest that the fundamental problem that needs to be 
solved if an even remotely adequate aim or blueprint for modern physics is to be 
developed, can be put like this: How can one weld together the fundamentally 
indeterministic aspect of things that seems to have been irreversibly ushered in with 
quantum mechanics with the kind of "classical," microrealistic, field theoretic 
viewpoint advocated by Einstein? 
Briefly, let me try to indicate this problem as I see it. One very striking feature of 
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quantum mechanics (QM) is that it is a theory which makes predictions exclusively 
about the outcome of performing measurements on microsystems. QM does not 
make predictions about the states of microsystems as such; rather the theory only 
makes purely conditional predictions about what would be found if a measurement 
were made. 
This basic feature of QM ensures that QM must rely on classical physics, or on 
some additional theory, for a treatment of the measuring process itself. QM alone 
cannot issue in any unconditional predictions whatsoever; it is only QM plus some 
relevant part of classical physics which actually issues in physical predictions. And 
this in turn means that QM is an aberrant theory, in that the theory which results in 
physical predictions consists of the postulates of QM plus the purely ad hoc 
relevant part of classical physics which is applied to the measuring instrument. 
In order to reformulate QM as a theory which can stand on its own feet, and 
which does not need to presuppose, in a wholly ad hoc way, some part of classical 
physics, it is clearly necessary to develop a version of QM which is microrealistic, 
which provides a consistent model for microphenomena. For as long as QM is a 
theory about microsystems interacting with macrosystems (measuring instruments) 
QM will need to rely on some purely adhoc additional theory for a treatment of the 
macrosystems. Only if QM is developed as a theory about microsystem interacting 
with microsystem (macrosystems simply emerging as the outcome of quantum 
mechanical interactions between many microsystems) will QM become non-ad hoc, 
nonaberrant. Thus only a microrealistic version of QM can be ultimately non- 
aberrant and acceptable. (See [10], [11], and [12] for a fuller statement of this 
argument.) 
At the moment, however, we do not have an idea of what a theory which is both 
indeterministic and microrealistic would look like, even in very general terms (see, 
however, [12]). It is the development of such a general idea that seems to me to be 
the most important task of aim articulation in physics today. We need to articulate 
in general terms possible kinds of fundamentally stochastic microrealistic theories, 
bearing in mind Einstein's important considerations which suggest that only field 
theories can be ultimately intelligible. Once we have a general idea of what an 
indeterministic microrealistic field theoretic theory looks like, we can then go on to 
consider in more detail how a physical theory of this type might be developed, and 
whether such a theory might help to resolve such outstanding fundamental 
problems as the reconciliation of QM and general relativity, and the problem of 
singularities in present day field theories. 
The main point that I wish to emphasize however is this. According to the aim 
oriented empiricist viewpoint advocated here, the absence of any viable, coherent, 
unified aim or blueprint for modern physics indicates that theoretical physics today 
is in a state of crisis. Without such a coherent aim, we cannot have any clear idea 
of where we are going, of what lines of inquiry we ought to pursue. We do not even 
have an adequate basis for assessing the acceptability of physical theories already 
proposed. It was just this that Einstein knew so well, and articulated so clearly, 
particularly in relation to the ultimate unacceptability-or problematic character- 
of QM. 
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Nothing could illustrate more vividly how radically Einstein's views about the 
nature and aims of physics differed from the viewpoint upheld by his contemporaries 
than Einstein's break with his contemporaries over QM. For Einstein, QM was a 
profoundly unintelligible theory because it abandons microrealism, and fails to be 
compatible with the best blueprint for physics. Despite all its enormous empirical 
success, QM was, therefore, for Einstein, quite rationally, a profoundly problematic 
theory, offering no guidelines for future developments in physics. To Einstein's 
contemporaries, however, all this was almost embarrassingly a prioristic and 
unscientific for, of course, if one accepts standard empiricism, there can be no 
possible rationale for finding an empirically successful theory problematic, just 
because it does not fit in with one's "metaphysical predilections." 
The attempt to pursue science in accordance with the edicts of standard 
empiricism actually plunges science, I have argued, into a measure of irrationality. 
This latent irrationality reveals itself most blatantly at moments of revolutionary 
change. Kuhn, in particular, has vividly described the manner in which rationality 
breaks down during phases of revolutionary change ([7], pp. 144-158). From the 
standpoint of aim oriented empiricism, we can see why it is that the widespread 
acceptance of standard empiricism is responsible for the breakdown in rationality, 
in the following way. A science has, let us suppose, some definite, but unarticulated 
blueprint B1. A succession of theories TL, T2, T3, are developed which successively 
move towards giving fuller and fuller articulations of B1. But then a new theory T4 
is developed, which is acceptable, and can be regarded as a definite improvement 
over T3, if a new blueprint B2 is accepted, but which is unacceptable if B1 is 
accepted. In order to judge rationally whether or not T4 constitutes an advance over 
T3 the crucial question that needs to be settled is whether the change of blueprint 
B1 to B2 constitutes an improvement or not. But it is precisely this crucial issue that 
scientists-unable to acknowledge and articulate scientific blueprints, due to their 
adherence to standard empiricism-are completely unable to discuss. The change 
of level 2 rules, of intelligibility criteria, brought about by the change of aims or 
blueprints B1 to B2, cannot itself be rationally assessed. All that can happen is that 
one group of scientists which favors B1 passionately declares T4 to be unacceptable, 
while another group with equal passion, declares that T7 constitutes a great advance. 
Rational discussion breaks down because orthodox ideas about science leave no 
room for the rational assessment of a change of blueprint and concomitant change 
of level 2 criteria of theory acceptability. 
According to the aim oriented empiricist viewpoint advocated here, the very 
contrast between normal science and revolutionary science is an irrational bi- 
product of a failure to articulate and improve the aims of a science. For aim im- 
provement, if pursued energetically, ought to anticipate, and in fact provoke 
revolutionary theoretical developments. In the above example, if aim improvement 
had been proceeding properly, B2 would have been articulated and accepted long 
before T4 was proposed; the arrival of T4 would thus occasion no surprise or shock. 
Science pursued in accordance with aim oriented empiricism takes us beyond the 
Kuhnian dichotomy of normal and revolutionary science. 
I have stressed the important implications that aim oriented empiricism has for 
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physics. Aim oriented empiricism has, however, perhaps even more important 
implications for the social sciences. For social scientists, anxious to make their 
disciplines scientifically respectable, have often sought (a) to suppress purely meta- 
physical "unscientific" speculation; (b) to model the methods of the social sciences 
as nearly as possible on the methods of the very successful natural sciences. 
According to aim oriented empiricism both these tendencies are disastrous. Without 
some kind of agreed aim or blueprint for a science, one hardly has a science at all. 
It is only when some kind of choice of blueprint has been made that one can have 
any idea of the kind of theory one is seeking to develop, and the kind of rules that 
ought to govern the acceptance and rejection of theories. The whole question of 
blueprint choice is especially important in a relatively young or unsuccessful 
science-as we may judge some of the social sciences to be. Furthermore, since 
sensible blueprints for social sciences are likely to be very different from any blue- 
print of physics, the level 2 methodology of the social sciences ought to be very 
different too. Thus, attempts to ape the methodology of the natural sciences are 
particularly unfortunate. All in all, anxious attempts to make the social sciences 
scientifically respectable by seeking to make them conform to the (false) ideals of 
standard empiricism will tend to have particularly unfortunate and stultifying 
consequences for these sciences. 
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